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Competing Accounts of Interpretation and Practical
Reasoning in the Debate over Originalism
ANDRÉ LEDUC *
ABSTRACT
This article explores two assumptions about constitutional law and the
form of practical reasoning inherent in constitutional argument and decision
that have shaped the debate over originalism. The first assumption—adopted
by originalists—is that constitutional reasoning is a formalistic process.
Originalism’s critics tacitly describe a very different and less formalistic
model. The second assumption—shared by originalists and most of its critics
alike—is that the central task of constitutional decision is to interpret the
Constitution.
Both of these assumptions are wrong. Constitutional argument is not, and
cannot be, reduced to the formal model of reasoning tacitly employed in
originalism. The critics of originalism correctly point out that constitutional
argument is more complex than originalism’s formal account allows. But
those critics share with originalists the mistaken premise that our
constitutional practice begins with interpretation. That agreement masks the
substantial differences in their respective accounts of interpretation, however.
This Article demonstrates how these two assumptions have contributed to
the fruitlessness of the debate. For example, if we reject the premise of the
logical priority of interpretation the celebrated problem of generality
dissolves. By articulating the jurisprudential foundations of the debate, this
Article allows us to recognize the sterility of the debate over originalism and
the likelihood that it cannot be successfully resolved by the protagonists on
either side of the debate. While discarding the formalism of contemporary
originalism does not compromise core originalist claims, the importance of
that formalism to some of originalism’s stronger claims of privilege makes
such an approach less attractive to originalism. Originalism’s critics, while
right about constitutional reasoning, fail to discredit other important
originalist claims. Thus, the protagonists in the debate may be likely to
continue even after better understanding interpretation and the practice of
constitutional argument. That would be a mistake. A better account of the
place of interpretation and the nature of practical reasoning in constitutional
reasoning also opens up the alternative of moving beyond the fruitless,
stalemated debate about originalism.

* © 2017 André LeDuc. I am grateful to Stewart Schoder and Laura Litten for
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft, and to Dennis Patterson, Charlotte Crane,
Jeff Greenblatt, and Kristin Hickman for comments on some closely related material.
Errors that remain are the author’s own.
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INTRODUCTION
I. ACCOUNTING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND REASONING
Originalism is not a theory of constitutional reasoning or a theory about
the nature of constitutional interpretation. 1 The classical originalists did not
come to their theory from a refined approach to language or hermeneutics. 2 It
is a legal or jurisprudential theory of the Constitution and about constitutional

1

Mitch Berman has previously made this point. See Mitchell N. Berman,
Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) [hereinafter Berman, Originalism]
(“[O]riginalism maintains that courts ought to interpret constitutional provisions solely
in accordance with some feature of those provisions' original character.”); see also
William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) [hereinafter Baude, Originalism as a Constraint] (describing the movement in
originalism from a theory of judicial constraint to a positive theory of constitutional
law).
2
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 115 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION] [hereinafter Dworkin, Interpretation]
(complimenting Justice Scalia, ironically, for having given his talk on interpretation
without referencing the work of Gadamer or hermeneutics); D. A. Jeremy Telman,
Originalism: A Thing Worth Doing . . . , 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 529, 537–40 (2016)
(describing the roots of originalism in a reaction to the constitutional jurisprudence of
the Warren Court).
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decision. 3 Its critics generally do not contest its claims on the basis of the
nature of constitutional reasoning or the place of interpretation in
constitutional theory and decision. 4 The abstraction of the continuing debate
increasingly obscures both the genealogy and import of originalism and the
stakes of the debate itself. 5
The debate over originalism is fruitless and pathological. 6 Turning to the
tacit competing accounts of practical reasoning and interpretation therefore
3

See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–72 (1977) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY] (arguing that the Warren Court’s Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence had moved very far from the original, historical understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1–6 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral
Principles] (contrasting principled judicial decision pursuant to the Constitution to
discretionary, value-laden decisions); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 9–14
(describing originalist interpretation as necessary to avoid usurpation of power by the
courts).
4
See Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1368,
1378–79 (1990) [hereinafter Posner, Bork]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES:
WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 71–73 (2005)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RADICALS] (arguing against originalism on prudential,
consequentialist grounds); Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 126–27 (arguing
that the best way to interpret the Constitution requires incorporating moral theory into
that interpretive process); Laurence Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, INTERPRETATION,
supra note 2, at 93–94 [hereinafter Tribe, Interpretation] (arguing that there are
different kinds of provisions in the Constitution, some of which admit of simpler,
semantic interpretation and others of which state principles that must be articulated
and applied in a more complex and principled way). But see Cass R. Sunstein, There
is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMM. 193, 202 (2015) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Nothing] (arguing that claims about the nature of interpretation do not argue
for originalism).
5
Some of this occurs expressly, as originalism is reformulated as a positive or
natural law theory of law. See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 2349, 2351–52 (2015) [hereinafter Baude, Our Law] (defending an account of
originalism as a positivist theory of constitutional law); Jeffrey Pojanowski & Kevin
C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 117–21 (2016) [hereinafter
Pojanowski & Walsh, Enduring Originalism] (natural law account of originalism).
But there are also strands in the debate in which the protagonists simply seem to lose
track of or tacitly abandon originalism’s purpose as the debate continues to unfold.
See Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the Complete
Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 2, 7 (2017) [hereinafter Kay,
Constitutional Construction] (rejecting the New Originalists’ project of constitutional
construction because it reopens the floodgates of judicial discretion).
6
This article is one of a series exploring and dissolving the debate over
originalism. The complex, interrelated arguments made in the series are generally
brought together in André LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel: Originalism, Its Critics, and

54

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 16, No. 1

may appear either a dead end or an unimportant exercise in the intellectual
history of the turn of the millennium. It appears of little interest and largely a
waste of effort. In fact, understanding those foundational premises reinforces
my arguments about the sterility of the debate over originalism and helps us to
translate what is valuable about the discourse of the debate back into the
constitutional vernacular of our decisional practice.
The premises about interpretation and practical reason play a central role
in the formulation of originalism as well as in the debate. Originalism offers
a highly formal account of constitutional reasoning, recognizing only specific
kinds of constitutional authority. 7 Indeed, originalism sometimes goes so far
as to suggest that constitutional reasoning may be cast as a series of
syllogisms. 8 Originalism’s critics generally offer a less formal account of
constitutional reasoning. 9 The elements that count as constitutional authority
are more wide ranging and the reasoning with respect to such authorities is far
less formal. 10 As with other elements in the debate, however, inconsistent
stances with respect to the nature of interpretation and constitutional reasoning
inform the debate without being generally recognized or articulated.
At the outset, it is important to outline the relationship among the theories
of meaning, interpretation, and practical reason inherent in the originalism
debate. As I have explored before, 11 the theories of constitutional meaning—
accounts of what the Constitution says, rather than, for the most part, what the
Constitution does—are largely implicit in the debate over originalism. They
describe the import of the Constitution that interpretation aims to identify and
the Promise of Our American Constitution, 26 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS. L.J.
(forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel] and André LeDuc,
Beyond Babel: Achieving the Promise of Our American Constitution, 64 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 185 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Beyond Babel].
7
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 262 (1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING] (criticizing nonoriginalist constitutional reasoning for not proceeding with major and minor premises
from the Constitution); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 44–45.
8
See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 262.
9
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 75 (2010)
[hereinafter BREYER, DEMOCRACY]; DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 169–79
(1996) [hereinafter PATTERSON, TRUTH] (expressly rejecting a formal account of legal
argument); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 269–72 (1990)
[hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMS]; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION
6–8 (2008) [hereinafter TRIBE, INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION]; LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 59–60, 87–91 (1991) [hereinafter
TRIBE & DORF, READING]; SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4 at 5.
10
See generally BREYER, DEMOCRACY. supra note 9.
11
André LeDuc, Making the Premises about Constitutional Meaning Express:
The New Originalism and Its Critics, 31 BYU J. PUB. L. 111 (2017) [hereinafter
LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning]
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articulate. Once that meaning has been articulated by the process of
interpretation, additional steps in the process of practical reasoning are
employed to determine the decision of the constitutional controversy at bar.
Thus, in the originalism debate, both sides generally take meaning to be the
end of interpretation and the beginning of the chain of practical reasoning that
decides a case. As with the tacit accounts of meaning in the debate, the
accounts of interpretation and practical reasoning are largely tacit, too.
The debate over originalism accords interpretation a fundamental and
foundational role in constitutional law in general and constitutional
adjudication in particular that it does not play. My first task in this article is
to explain why the assumption about the fundamental nature of interpretation
is mistaken and how it informs the originalism debate. Originalism—the New
Originalism—addresses this mistake by qualifying the role of interpretation
and proclaiming a fundamentally important distinction between interpretation
and construction. 12
Attention to the purported distinction between
interpretation and construction is one of the two key moves in the New
Originalism. 13 My second task in this article is to argue why that distinction
is not only problematic, but also a dead end in revivifying originalism and
winning the debate for the originalists.
I first argue that originalism largely assumes that the task of constitutional
adjudication begins with interpretation, an assumption that most of
originalism’s critics share. 14 I have previously explored the concepts of
12
See generally Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Interpretation and Construction];
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Constitutional Construction]; Lawrence B.
Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010)
[hereinafter Solum, Distinction].
13
See generally Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J.
609 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, New Originalism]; Keith Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New
Originalism]; Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 12; Solum,
Constitutional Construction, supra note 12. But see John McGinnis & Michael
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the
Case against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) (challenging the need for
constitutional construction in originalism); Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra
note 5 (arguing that the introduction of the methods is unnecessary and, moreover,
compromises the originalist project of cabining judicial discretion). The other key
difference between the new and the old is reliance on the original public semantic
meanings rather than the original intentions of the relevant actors.
14
For a critical analysis of the triumph of interpretative theories see Michael
Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 871, 942–57 (1989) [hereinafter Moore, Interpretative Turn]; see also Michael
Moore, Interpreting interpretation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
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constitutional meaning in the debate, the target at which interpretation aims,
as Richard Fallon has put it. 15 I will explore in some detail the claims and
commitments made as to the nature of the interpretative project.
Interpretation, according to originalists, provides the necessary nexus between
the text and the constitutional question presented for decision. The assumed
need for an interpretation creates the potential for the originalists and their
critics to debate the so-called problem of generality. 16 The problem of
generality dissolves without the tacit assumption of the need for an
interpretation before a constitutional provision may be applied in
constitutional adjudication. 17
Although the commitment to interpretation is shared by many of
originalism’s critics, 18 some critics of originalism, including pragmatists like
Posner, have challenged the assumption that interpretation is prior to

PHILOSOPHY 1 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) [hereinafter LAW AND INTERPRETATION]
[hereinafter Moore, Interpretation] (arguing against an interpretive account of the
law). While some of originalism’s critics have offered an alternative noninterpretative account of adjudication, that alternative has not been the mainstream line
of criticism, and it takes the challenge to originalism in a direction different from that
defended by the principal critics. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE] (arguing
that constitutional law is created by sometimes inconsistent modes of argument that
are not simply deployed as interpretations of the Constitution to decide constitutional
cases).
15
LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 11, at 111; Richard Fallon, The
Meaning of Meaning, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2015) [hereinafter Fallon,
Meaning] (“Almost self-evidently, meaning is the object, or at least one of the objects,
that statutory and constitutional interpretation seek to discover.” (footnote omitted)).
16
See generally TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 73–80 (arguing that
there is a fundamental interpretative problem in constitutional interpretation because
the level of generality of the constitutional provisions is unspecified).
17
Id.; Robert B. Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination:
The Normative Fine Structure of the Judges’ Chain Novel, in PRAGMATISM, LAW, AND
LANGUAGE 19, 21–22 (Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind eds., 2014) [hereinafter
Brandom, Legal Concept Determination; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note
11, at 118 n.27, 218.
18
See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–27 (1986) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, EMPIRE] (describing an idiosyncratic concept of legal interpretation);
Moore, Interpretative Turn, supra note 14 at 891-92. But see Dennis Patterson,
Interpretation in Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685, 686–88 (2005) [hereinafter
Patterson, Interpretation] (arguing against the priority of interpretation in
understanding or applying law).
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understanding and decision. 19 They argue that the task of adjudication—of
judging—cannot be reduced to one of interpretation, even when a
constitutional case presents a question of the application of a constitutional
text. 20 They argue that the task is not a semantic one because decision must
focus on the consequences of potential decisions and rationales. 21 I have
explored the pragmatist account in a companion article. 22 Here, I will explore
the non-pragmatist objections to the interpretative model of constitutional
decision. One such objection is made by natural law theorists, including
natural law originalists. 23 These theorists assert that the overriding authority
of natural law must inform the reading and application of positive law—
regardless of what reading the best interpretation of that positive law might
otherwise yield. 24 The interpretive model should be rejected, in the natural
law theorists’ view, because the mission of constitutional adjudication is not
the interpretation of the meaning of constitutional provisions; rather, it is
deciding the merits of the competing claims in a constitutional controversy—
within the decisional metrics of our constitutional practice.
Interpretation is neither central to constitutional decision nor must
interpretation logically precede such decision. Interpretation is an important
element in the textual mode of constitutional argument and, to a lesser degree,
in historical argument. It is not important in the other modes of constitutional
argument.
By contrast with the generally shared emphasis on interpretation, the
protagonists in the debate advance very different accounts of practical
19
See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 269–72 (questioning whether the
judicial project of applying statutory or constitutional provisions is best characterized
as interpretation).
20
See generally Posner, Bork, supra note 4, at 1380–81 (“The originalist faces
backwards, but steals frequent sideways glances at consequences. The pragmatist
places the consequences in the foreground.”).
21
Id.
22
See generally André LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism and Pragmatism in the
Debate about Originalism, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 613 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc,
Paradoxes of Positivism] (arguing that there is a fundamental failure on the part of the
originalists and their pragmatist critics to engage because they disagree about the
underlying question whether the Constitution should be interpreted from a
deontological or consequentialist stance).
23
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 122–25 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, LOST]; Moore, Interpretative Turn,
supra note 14, at 917–18.
24
See ROBERT P. GEORGE, Natural Law and Positive Law, in IN DEFENSE OF
NATURAL LAW 102, 107–09 (1999) [hereinafter GEORGE, Natural Law] (explaining
the direct and indirect ways that positive law may be derived from natural law). See
generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011)
[hereinafter FINNIS, NATURAL LAW].
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reasoning in constitutional theory and decision. Originalists, on the one hand,
characterize key—if not all—steps of constitutional reasoning as formal
syllogisms with constitutional text providing the major premises in such
arguments. 25 That characterization of constitutional reasoning is an important
constitutive element of originalism's highly formalistic theory of constitutional
argument and reasoning. 26 The consequence of this model of constitutional
reasoning is that originalism endorses an account of an almost mechanical
judicial decision-making process. 27 Critics, on the other hand, do not share all
of originalism’s assumptions about constitutional reasoning. Instead, the
critics describe constitutional reasoning and argument as ranging beyond
formal syllogisms, with relevant premises in such arguments going beyond the
premises derived directly from the constitutional text. 28 Their model of
reasoning is much more open-ended.
But neither the originalists nor their critics articulate the implications of
their competing descriptions of constitutional reasoning. For example,
Dworkin denies the formal account of legal reasoning from legal rules that
originalism offers. 29 He argues that constitutional reasoning is more complex
and its sources broader. 30 But Dworkin effectively assimilates constitutional
reasoning in decisions to philosophical reasoning. 31 That characterization is
25

See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 262 (endorsing the model of the
syllogism with major and minor premises in constitutional reasoning).
26
See generally infra Part III.
27
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 45 (characterizing the
Constitution as generally “simple to apply”); Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra
note 5, at 25 (“Constitutional construction, at its heart, puts its trust in human judgment
not in historically fixed rules. This is—not to put too fine a point on it—the opposite
of constitutionalism.”).
28
See, e.g., BREYER, DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 78–82 (defending an account
of the Living Constitution from the perspective of an anti-originalist justice of the
Supreme Court).
29
Thus, Dworkin denies that all legal authorities have the structure of legal rules.
See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, The Model of Rules: I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
14, 22–23 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING] [hereinafter DWORKIN, Rules I]
(arguing that law consists not only of legal rules that may be applied simply, but also
of legal principles which are more complex and more reasoned, as well as less
peremptory).
30
DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 365–89 (considering the proper authorities
to be considered in deciding a case like Brown).
31
Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity ascribes a substantial place to the
coherence and consistency of the public and private law and argues that such law must
ultimately be formulated in light of our moral and political theory; only philosophical
argument can satisfy that requirement. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 96–
98 (emphasizing both the interaction of law and moral theory and that they remain
distinct); see also André LeDuc, The Ontological Foundations of the Debate over
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questionable, too. It is questionable both because philosophical argument does
not look like constitutional argument and because philosophical argument, as
a metaphilosophical matter, does not play that role in our constitutional
practice. 32
More fundamentally, Toulmin has challenged the project of reducing
practical reasoning to a formal, logical account. 33 The practice of
constitutional argument is not described well by the formal account offered by
originalism. That descriptive failure grounds an important argument as to why
the originalist account cannot be an adequate account of constitutional
reasoning. There is no stance outside our practice of constitutional argument
from which to criticize those arguments that are made and the results that are
obtained. The absence of such an Archimedean or neutral stance puts a
premium on the accuracy and completeness of descriptive accounts of
constitutional law. It is on the basis of those descriptions and, sometimes,
redescriptions of our constitutional law from within our practice that
constitutional arguments may be made.
Originalism’s principal critics also generally fail to offer an account of
practical reasoning in our constitutional practice that allows a place for the
exercise of judgment. 34 For example, Ronald Dworkin defends a “Right
Answer Thesis” that asserts that every legal question, including every
constitutional question, has a unique right answer that can be identified by the
application of his decisional method. 35 Instead of articulating the role of
judgment in constitutional decision, the critics seek an algorithmic account that
can fully explain the process of constitutional decision. 36 That search is
Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 263, 317 (2015) [hereinafter LeDuc, Ontological
Foundations].
32
See André LeDuc, The Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy: Five
Lessons from the Originalism Debate, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 155 (2014)
[hereinafter LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation].
33
See STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT vii (updated ed. 2003) (1958)
[hereinafter TOULMIN, ARGUMENT] (criticizing “the assumption, made by most AngloAmerican academic philosophers, that any significant argument can be put in formal
terms . . . [as] a rigidly demonstrable deduction . . . .”).
34
For a non-originalist statement of the importance of judgment, see Charles
Fried, On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025, 1043–44 (2011) [hereinafter
Fried, Judgment] (defending the claim that constitutional questions require the
exercise of judgment and that the strongest opinions of Justice Scalia are not those that
hew most closely to his originalist jurisprudential theory, but those that reflect a
compelling constitutional judgment).
35
See RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119 (1985) (arguing that there is one right answer even to hard
legal questions); DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 43–44.
36
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Hercules, Abraham Lincoln, the United States
Constitution, and the Problem of Slavery, in RONALD DWORKIN 136, 149–55 (Arthur
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misguided. I’ll describe an alternative account of constitutional reasoning. On
that account, while argument is constrained by convention—or something like
it—judgment must always play an important role.
Admittedly, some of originalism’s critics also endorse this alternative
account of constitutional reasoning. 37 But some of those same critics repudiate
the originalists’ formal account of constitutional reasoning only to assimilate
constitutional reasoning to political decision-making. 38 That, too, is a mistake.
It is a mistake because our practice of constitutional argument and decision
operates within its own framework, distinct from if not entirely independent
of the political decision-making sphere. 39 Naked political arguments are not
made within that practice, and the arguments that are made do not translate or
reduce nicely to political argument. 40
My third and final task in this article is to explain how the claims made
here about the originalism debate fit together with my claim that the debate is
grounded in mistaken or confused premises and that it is fruitless and
pathological. Because the protagonists in the debate assume different premises
about constitutional interpretation and constitutional reasoning, it is hardly
surprising that they talk past each other in the debate. Most obviously, this
article develops the account of reasoning and interpretation that I sketched in
Ripstein ed., 2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Hercules] (criticizing Dworkin’s
description of constitutional decision because it fails to determine how Dred Scott
ought to have been decided). But see BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 6–7
(emphasizing the role of constitutional judgment and asserting that no constitutional
theory can determine decisions).
37
See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 80–81; Levinson, Hercules,
supra note 36, at 155.
38
See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in
Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 646–47 (1984). See generally MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1988); STANLEY FISH, Wrong Again, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE,
RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 105
(1989); STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND
LEGAL STUDIES 87 (1989) [hereinafter FISH, Working on the Chain Gang].
39
See Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1311–12 (1989)
[hereinafter Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?]; BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 6.
40
See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT 241–44 (2004) [hereinafter FRIED, SAYING] (arguing that the
demands of doctrine result in Justices voting and arguing in ways that do not reduce
easily to traditional political classifications); BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 6
(offering examples of kinds of arguments that are impermissible in constitutional
adjudication); Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 39, at 1302–12 (arguing that such
a reduction of law to politics misunderstands the nature of constitutional argument and
our constitutional practice).

2017

THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM

61

my earlier articles. 41 It also complements the claims I have made about how
the premises about constitutional meaning factor into the debate. Moreover,
from the critical strands in this analysis, we can also draw out the elements in
the debate that may be incorporated into a more productive constitutional
discourse. That discourse rejects foundational assumptions and acknowledges
that there is no Archimedean stance from which we can assess constitutional
argument and decision. Our argument and decision must be carried on within
our practice as a matter of the social facts that comprise that practice.
II. THE PRIORITY AND PRIMACY OF INTERPRETATION
A. The Interpretative Claims of Classical Originalism
Underlying the originalism debate is the originalist claim that the mission
of constitutional adjudication is principally constitutional interpretation. 42
First, originalists are committed to the logical priority of interpretation:
constitutional adjudication must begin with the interpretation of the meaning
of the constitutional text (or, in some cases, the relevant constitutional
precedent). 43 Second, originalists are committed to the primacy of
interpretation: the reading of the constitutional text provided by interpretation
provides a privileged ground on which to decide the case at hand. 44 Therefore,
originalists argue, interpretation of the constitutional text trumps other grounds
of decision. 45

41
See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31, at 274–88, 306–22
(briefly describing the accounts of interpretation and reasoning underlying the
opposing positions in the debate over originalism); see also LeDuc, Constitutional
Meaning, supra note 11 (exploring in some detail that theoretical assumptions about
meaning in general and the nature of the meaning of the constitutional text in
particular).
42
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 37, 46-47.
43
The role of precedent and, in particular, non-originalist precedent has always
been problematic for originalism. See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 157–
59; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 138–40 (asserting that originalism’s
approach to precedent is not dissimilar to that of other theories).
44
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 37–47.
45
See id. at 37–39.
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Those commitments are generally implicit. 46 They seem sometimes to be
taken to be so obvious as to warrant no attention. 47 Interpretation is generally
thought to be necessary both for understanding the constitutional text and for
constitutional decision. 48 The originalist project is to interpret the Constitution
by determining and then privileging 49 the original understanding of the
meaning of the Constitution. 50 The originalist interpretations then provide the
propositions to support the reasoning to originalist constitutional decision. 51
The originalist interpretive model has an intuitive appeal—at least for early
twenty-first century American lawyers—that non-interpretive theories do not
have. 52 Such non-interpretive theories do not have that appeal because of the

46
See id.; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 139-41 (grounding the need for the
Court to interpret the Constitution on the basis of the original understanding in the
requirements of the democratic republic and the so-called countermajoritarian
problem). But see Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 18 (denying interpretation
priority in judicial decision).
47
See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note
7; Frank H. Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
479, 485–86 (1993) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Alternatives].
48
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 44–45 (asserting that the
difficulties of deciding cases are negligible for originalism compared to those facing
alternative theories).
49
See id. at 37–39.
50
See id.; Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 13, at 599.
51
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 43–44 (offering an originalist
account of the requirements of the confrontation clause).
52
Interpretative theories might not have the same appeal in the English common
law tradition to the extent that common law methods are even more dominant. See id.
at 3–9 (describing the exhilaration of the common law for law students, lawyers, and,
above all, judges). Interpretative theories have an intuitive appeal to us because they
assimilate our efforts to follow the constitutional directives to other common forms of
communicative behavior. Sunstein captures that assimilation best. See SUNSTEIN,
RADICALS, supra note 4, at 57 (“Fundamentalism also seems to have a justification in
ordinary thinking about interpretation. If your friend asks you to do something, you’re
likely to try to understand the original meaning of his words.”). Sunstein is likely
mistaken here, in an understandable but philosophically naïve way. You don’t try to
understand the meaning of the words; you try to understand what your friend would
like you to do. Well, Sunstein might reply, without the ability to read minds, how is
that to be done without understanding what the words mean? While it is natural to
assume that the process of understanding begins with, and his focused on,
understanding the words employed, that claim is hardly well-defended—or clearly
established. See THOMAS NAGEL, Sexual Perversion, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 39, 45–
48 (1979) (exploring the complex non-linguistic communication patterns in normal
human sexual desire).
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prevalence of the interpretative model. 53 That dominance is not limited, of
course, to the confines of the originalism debate. 54
Classical originalism takes the task of constitutional theory and the task of
the judge in constitutional adjudication as that of interpreting the
Constitution. 55 Classical originalism assumes that if it can show that the
constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren Court was not rooted in
interpretations of the meaning of the Constitution, then the legitimacy of that
constitutional jurisprudence can be called into question. 56 Generally, classical
originalists assert that the project of interpretation should be aimed at
articulating the meaning of the relevant constitutional provision. 57
Understanding originalism’s commitment to its account of constitutional
decision as a matter of interpretation starts with originalism’s definition of

53

See Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 14, at 873 (acknowledging the
prevalence of interpretive theory, but arguing that a variety of interpretive theories that
purport to avoid the debate between realism and anti-realism, including that defended
by Dworkin, are metaphysically and epistemologically mistaken).
54
See generally Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 14, at 873; LAW AND
INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at 873; THE INTERPRETATIVE TURN: PHILOSOPHY,
SCIENCE, CULTURE (David R. Hiley et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERPRETATIVE
TURN].
55
See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 (1999) [hereinafter
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7,
at 154 (characterizing originalism as a “method of interpretation”); SCALIA,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 9–14 (rejecting broader common law decisional
methods with respect to constitutional law). But see Baude, Our Law, supra note 5, at
2405–10 (arguing that originalism is not a theory of interpretation but a positivist
theory of law).
56
Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 3, at 6–8. See generally BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 3.
57
Fallon, Meaning, supra note 15, at 1237.
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interpretation 58—to determine the meaning of a text. 59 Originalism begins
with the intuition that the general or abstract language of a constitutional
provision does not always immediately or obviously provide an answer to a
constitutional question or dispute that presents itself. 60 Interpretation is the
principal technique that instantiates the general meaning of the constitutional
text in the particular context at hand.61 That meaning may be based upon the
framers’ original understandings, intentions, or expectations. The relevant
community with respect to such social facts may vary in different forms of
originalism, but in each case, originalism assumes the existence of such

58

Interpretation is a complex and controversial concept. See generally
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson
& Steven Mailloux eds., 1988) [hereinafter INTERPRETING LAW] (exploring
fundamental questions with respect to the nature of interpretation in a broad range of
contexts); INTERPRETIVE TURN, supra note 54 (describing, as the title suggests, the
important role of interpretation in a wide range of contemporary cultural and academic
fields); Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 18 (arguing for a limited role for
interpretation in constitutional practice).
Classically, interpretation was distinguished from explanation, with explanation
the project of the natural sciences and interpretation the projects of the humanities.
Yet even with the weakening, if not collapse, of that distinction, the concept of
constitutional interpretation as the process of articulating and expressing the meaning
of the Constitution and of the provisions thereof is widely accepted. See James F.
Bohman, et al., Introduction: The Interpretative Turn, in INTERPRETATIVE TURN, at 2–
3 (noting that interpretation does not have an accepted definition).
59
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 430 (2012) [hereinafter SCALIA & GARNER,
READING LAW] (defining interpretation as determining the meaning of a text).
Interpretation is a complex and controversial concept.
See generally
INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 58 (exploring fundamental questions with respect to
the nature of interpretation in a broad range of contexts); INTERPRETATIVE TURN,
supra note 54; Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 18 (arguing for a limited role for
interpretation in constitutional practice).
Classically, interpretation was distinguished from explanation, with explanation
the project of the natural sciences and interpretation the projects of the humanities.
Yet even with the weakening, if not collapse, of that distinction, the concept of
constitutional interpretation as the process of articulating and expressing the meaning
of the Constitution and of the provisions thereof is widely accepted. See James F.
Bohman, et al., Introduction: The Interpretative Turn, in INTERPRETATIVE TURN, at 2–
3 (noting that interpretation does not have an accepted definition).
60
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 45.
61
See id. (describing the judicial task as applying the constitutional text to “new
and unforeseen phenomena”); WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 1–
2.
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constructs. 62 Assuming an unchanging constitutional text, originalism relies
upon the concept of interpretation to specify the meaning of the general or
abstract constitutional text in varying contexts. 63 The first mission of
originalists is to identify and articulate the original meaning of the
constitutional text. Once that is done, the originalists apply that meaning to
resolve contemporary constitutional disputes. 64 While the foundations for that
mission and the power of the arguments made in reliance on that original
meaning may appear paradoxical, 65 the force and importance of such
arguments is well established. 66
Bork, perhaps the most important of the early originalists, is representative
when he describes the interpretive mission expressly as one of interpreting the
original meaning of the Constitution. 67 But originalists generally have not
focused clearly on the reason why a judge’s task is to interpret the
Constitution. 68 The reason is likely that they typically do not see an
alternative. 69 Two leading originalists who do confront an alternative are
Judge Bork and Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia believes that the judicial

62

There may be occasional, rare exceptions, but those exceptions are not viewed
as challenging the originalist theory or posing a material impediment to the mission.
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 45; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at
166 (arguing that in the rare case in which the meaning of a constitutional provision
cannot be determined, such a provision should be given no effect, as if obscured by an
“ink blot”).
63
For a non-originalist account of this process, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171–73 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Translation]
(arguing that the originalists’ self-proclaimed goal of maintaining fidelity to the
original meaning of the constitutional text requires the methods of translation).
64
See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 9–24; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 2, at 37–38, 45.
65
Cf. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 9 (noting that the sciences and the arts do
not admit of such historical arguments).
66
Indeed, such arguments were clearly well established long before modern
originalism offered a defense of such methods.
67
See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 139–51. Justice Scalia also states the
mission of a judge in interpretative terms. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at
37–39. Other leading originalists take interpretation to be the charge of constitutional
law, too. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1109, 1119–20 (1998) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Dead Hand] (arguing that
new originalists are textualists committed to interpreting the constitutional words).
68
See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 57–58.
69
For an account of the failure to recognize alternatives, see LeDuc, Striding Out
of Babel, supra note 6 at 10–13. For an example of such thinking, see BORK,
TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 251 (characterizing theories of constitutional interpretation
that reject the original understanding as impossible).
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alternative to interpreting the Constitution is rewriting it. 70 According to
Justice Scalia, departing from the interpretation of the Constitution’s original
meaning rewrites the Constitution and results in a body of constitutional law
that lacks legitimacy. 71 It lacks legitimacy because it is grounded neither on
historic democratic choices embodied in the text of the Constitution nor on an
authoritative democratic enactment. 72 The absence of the former is obvious to
Justice Scalia. The absence of consensus follows from the nature of value
choices and the diversity found in our modern Republic. Thus, interpretation,
or lawyers’ work, as Justice Scalia puts it, 73 becomes the judicial mission by
default. 74 For Bork, the alternative to originalism is an indeterminate
constitutional law and uncabined judicial discretion. 75 When non-originalist
authorities are introduced, the judge is left with a broad discretion to read the
Constitution and decide cases on this account. 76
Interpretation in this context gives a translation or reading of a
constitutional provision that is focused upon the question at hand. 77 The
originalists would not generally characterize their project of interpretation as
70
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 86, 140. Those would not appear
the only options, however. As has been remarked, a variety of decisional rules would
cabin judicial discretion. See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal
Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 885–87 (2015) [hereinafter Sachs, Legal
Change].
71
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 9 (arguing that constitutional
decision employing the full array of common law methods “would be an unqualified
good, were it not for a trend in government that has developed in recent centuries,
called democracy”).
72
Id. at 10.
73
Id. at 46.
74
Id. at 46–47; see BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 143–46. Although Bork
does not expressly characterize his project as one of interpretation, that project to
determine the meaning of the Constitution is manifestly interpretative.
75
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 251–59 (making the strong claim that nonoriginalist theories are impossible).
76
Id.
77
Originalists have not endorsed the concept of translation that Lessig has
defended because it emphasizes the distance between the original text and its
contemporary exposition and application. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, The
Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of
Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435 (1997) [hereinafter Calabresi, Lessig’s
Theory] (criticizing Lessig’s theory of translation as an inadequate description of our
constitutional practice and yields a quietist theory of constitutional decision that leaves
no ground from which to criticize decisions that we view as erroneous or misguided);
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 395 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings]; Lessig,
Translation, supra note 63; Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 18, at 687 (denying
Quine’s claims about the central place of translation).
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a matter of translation because translation is generally made from one language
to another. The originalists deny that there are different linguistic communities
across which translation is necessary. 78 Thus, constitutional interpretation is
contextual. The contexts are the questions of import and force that arise over
time with respect to the Constitution in our democratic constitutional republic.
Interpretive theories are dominant today. There is a substantial literature that
examines legal interpretation generally, and constitutional interpretation in
particular, and compares it to the interpretation of other texts. 79 For example,
Justice Scalia’s Tanner lectures at Princeton were titled A Matter of
Interpretation. 80 Similarly, Bork and Easterbrook describe the originalist
mission as one of interpretation. 81 Indeed, the commitment to interpretation
would appear to range across the varieties of originalism.
While all varieties of originalism appear committed to an interpretive
theory, the nature of that commitment varies. According to the principal
varieties of originalism, the judge’s task is to interpret the Constitution.82
Within this assumed interpretive mission, originalism’s contribution is to help
determine which interpretation of a constitutional provision should be given

78

See generally Calabresi, Lessig’s Theory, supra note 77; Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings, supra 78; Lessig, Translation, supra note 63; Patterson,
Interpretation, supra note 18.
79
See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (3d ed. 2009); DWORKIN,
EMPIRE, supra note 19, at 228–29; INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 58.
But there are alternative accounts of constitutional adjudication that do not rely
on, or do not rely exclusively on, a model of interpretation. So, for example, to the
extent that we characterize the Constitution as a series of rules, there are important
philosophical theories that suggest that we may follow such rules without need for, or
recourse to, an interpretation. See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS §§ 198–202 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1953) [hereinafter
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS]; Brandom, Legal Concept
Determination, supra note 17, at 21–22. Most fundamentally, Wittgenstein appears to
suggest that we cannot need an interpretation of a rule to follow the rule, because each
such interpretation would itself need an interpretation. Moreover, the role of a rule is
not merely to state a rule; it is to give us a rule. When we consider that function, we
may come to wonder and ultimately question whether an interpretation of the meaning
of a rule could be prior to the ability to apply the rule.
80
See generally Antonin Scalia, Foreword, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER
CENTURY OF DEBATE 37, 43 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) (referring to originalism
as a “philosophy of constitutional interpretation”).
81
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
349, 349–51 (1992); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 146–49.
82
See Easterbrook, Alternatives, supra note 47, at 485–86 (arguing that there are
none); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 143–46; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra
note 2, at 37–40.
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and what ought to be taken into account in that interpretive project. 83 The
originalist answer varies in its particulars.84 Certain originalist theories share
a strategy to restrict their scope by limiting the role of interpretation generally.
Michael Perry, for example, believes that interpretation is only one part of the
task of appellate adjudication. 85 Another part of that task is to specify the
content of indeterminate constitutional provisions. Interpretation, in Perry’s
theory, can only operate with respect to specific constitutional provisions. 86
Indeterminate provisions need to be given meaning, but that project is neither
one of interpretation nor best performed by the courts. Instead, Perry would
look to the executive and legislative branches to specify the necessary content
for such provisions. 87
Similarly, originalists like Keith Whittington give interpretation a logical
pride of place, while limiting its role and acknowledging the place of
constitutional construction. 88 I have noted above the problems caused by
83

See generally André LeDuc, Evolving Originalism: What Is Privileged?, 5 (Jan.
12, 2013) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (exploring what original
intentions, understandings, or expectations ought to be privileged in reading or
interpreting the Constitution, and how, in the principal varieties of originalism).
84
Thus, for example, an original expectations theory interprets the constitutional
text on the basis of the expected effect that the text would have while an original public
semantic understandings theory interprets the text on the basis of the original public
understandings. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45
LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999) (“Perhaps most important of all, however, originalism
has itself changed-from original intention to original meaning. No longer do
originalists claim to be seeking the subjective intentions of the framers.”).
85
See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS?
74–75, 95–101 (1994) (arguing that interpretation is the task of the courts only when
facing determinate provisions of the Constitution.) [hereinafter PERRY,
CONSTITUTION].
86
Id. at 70–71.
87
Id. at 202–04. Whittington and Barnett adopt a very similar strategy with the
distinction between interpretation and construction.
Both concede that for
indeterminate and undetermined provisions the original intentions or understandings
cannot alone determine the constitutional content.
See WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7–13 (constitutional
construction is essentially political); BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23, at 118–130.
88
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING
(1999)
[hereinafter
WHITTINGTON,
AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION] (articulating a non-originalist account of
constitutional construction to permit originalism as an exclusive account of
constitutional interpretation); WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 55.
Whittington sorts constitutional provisions into determinate provisions that need only
interpretation, and indeterminate provisions, for which rules must be constructed by
the three branches of the Federal government. Id.; see also Randy E. Barnett,
Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST.
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incorporation of a broader concept of construction. 89 Nevertheless, privileging
an original understanding of text, expectation, or intent, is what marks an
interpretative theory as originalist. For originalists, the neutral, legitimate
application of the Constitution begins first with interpretation. 90 As an
interpretive theory, originalism is in the mainstream of contemporary theories
of constitutional interpretation. 91
I have previously explored some of the tacit premises about meaning that
underlie the debate, including some of the reasons to question those tacit
premises. 92 But even conceding those premises, the protagonists in the debate
defend or assume questionable claims about constitutional reasoning and the
place of interpretation. Originalism’s emphasis on interpretation and its
disregard for the performative element of constitutional provisions contrast
with the account originalism offers of the performative role of the Constitution
as a whole. 93 An interpretative account of the constitutional text assumes that
the meaning of the Constitution is a matter of the semantics of the
constitutional text. 94 A performative account recognizes that the semantic
meaning of the Constitution is only one contributor to the broader import that
the constitutional text has in performing certain missions. 95
COMMENT. 257, 263–66 (2005) (outlining an exception to preserve non-originalist
precedent where the Court’s task was one of specifying an indeterminate or
undetermined constitutional content). Those strategies may be seen as another attempt
to deny the indeterminacy of the constitutional doctrine that Bobbitt highlights and
savors. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 31–42
(1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION] (arguing that classical accounts of the
indeterminacy of legal doctrine falter because of their failure to recognize the role of
the competing modes of argument).
89
See infra text accompanying notes 104–153.
90
See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 37–40 (contrasting the
proper task of constitutional interpretation with the more free-ranging process of
common-law adjudication).
91
See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY (Rev. 2d ed.
2005) [hereinafter, MARMOR, INTERPRETATION]; DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31.
But see PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 9, at 169–72; Moore, Interpretative Turn,
supra note 14; Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 18 (arguing against the priority of
interpretation in understanding or applying law).
92
LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 11.
93
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 40–41 (describing the
conservative role of the Constitution and, indeed, any constitution, as preventing the
erosion or disregard of fundamental social and political values).
94
See, e.g., id. at 144.
95
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:
THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012) [hereinafter AMAR,
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION]; see also BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 139
(describing the Constitution as providing for two competing fundamental principles:
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For example, when the text of Article I Section 3 provides that, “[t]he Vice
President shall be the President of the Senate,” it might appear that the terms
in the phrase “shall be the President of the Senate” must mean exactly what
they mean in the corresponding declarative statement and that the meaning of
the constitutional performative text incorporating those terms therefore shares
that same meaning. Indeed, it may be difficult to imagine any ambiguity in
such a phrase. Yet the issues that arise in the case of the trial of a proposed
impeachment of the Vice President demonstrate that questions arise with
respect to the performative text that do not arise with respect to the declarative
text. 96 Despite the clause’s semantic meaning, it seems unlikely that the Vice
President could be permitted to preside over his or her own impeachment trial.
Yet, according to the interpretive account, no such exception would appear
proper. The exception naturally understood with respect to the performative
constitutional text is not a matter of semantics. Instead, the better explanation
for the source of the exception is a matter of pragmatics, what the
constitutional text is doing rather than simply what it is saying. What it is
doing is articulating a rule for ensuring that a disinterested judge presides in
an impeachment trial of the President. Understood from that performative
perspective, the corollary in the case of an impeachment trial of the Vice
President does not pose a difficult question for decision.
Interpretation of the meaning of the constitutional text assumes that an
inquiry into the semantic content of the text is sufficient to identify the
linguistic content of that text. 97 Interpretation of a constitutional text takes for
granted that the meaning of the text is invariant and is formed from its semantic
components under syntactical rules. When we consider the performative role
of the constitutional text, however, we introduce an array of non-semantic
elements and, indeed, potentially introduce non-linguistic elements into the
analysis. The non-linguistic elements are the political and legal practices that
the constitutional texts implicate.98 To take an example highlighted by
Bobbitt, 99 our understanding of why the stomach pumping by the police in
democratic self government and the protection of certain individual rights against the
majority).
96
See generally AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 95.
97
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 44–45.
98
I want to distinguish this claim from the claim that there is an Unwritten or
Invisible Constitution that is to be interpreted along with the conventional written
Constitution. While these other non-linguistic social practices with regard to the
exercise of power by the government and the exercise of freedom and choice by
citizens inform our readings of the Constitution there is nothing added to our
understanding by constructing concepts like the Invisible or Unwritten Constitutions.
99
See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 104–05 (advancing Rochin as an example
of ethical argument in our constitutional decisional practice on the ground that police
pumping the stomach of a suspect to secure evidence in a criminal investigation
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Rochin v. California 100 was wrong is as much a matter of the respect we have
for autonomy with respect to our bodies as the constitutional text. The
performative nature of the Constitution, which creates the limited government
that must respect our corporal autonomy, makes the embedding in and
reconciliation with those non-linguistic social practices all the more intimate
and complex. 101 Those relationships are more involved and complex than a
mere declarative text would have.
Originalism recognizes that the purpose of the Constitution is to do
something, but it appears to lose sight of that as it addresses particular
provisions and offers a general theory of constitutional interpretation. 102 It
conflates declarative and performative statements, assimilating the analysis of
the latter to the analysis of the former. 103 Thus, for example, when Justice
Scalia has repeatedly considered the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
constituted an unacceptable State assault on citizens’ autonomy rather than a violation
of established constitutional law protecting against self-incrimination).
100
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
101
Philip Bobbitt captures the performative nature of the United States
Constitution by contrasting its guarantees with the claims made to objective truth of
Stalinist Russia (and implicitly the empty, infelicitous performatives of the Soviet
Union Constitution purportedly guaranteeing individual rights never delivered). The
Soviet Constitution’s sweeping guarantee of rights were largely meaningless because
they lacked a performative power. For the inspiring provisions of that text, saying did
not make it so. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at xvii (calling out the irrelevance
of the Soviets’ appeal to objective facts). The Constitution played a similar
performative role in constituting the Republic because, while its adoption was
inconsistent with the Articles of Confederation, it was accepted by the States and by
the People. See generally MICHAEL G. KLARMAN, THE FRAMER’S COUP: THE MAKING
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2016).
102
See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Papers Series No. 07-24 [hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism].
Professor Solum has questioned whether his SSRN paper ought to be cited, but as it
does not carry a disclaiming legend, it seems substantially consistent with his other,
published papers, and he has himself cited it without qualification, I continue to do so
as well. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 482 n.6 (2013); Solum, Interpretation-Construction
Distinction, supra note 16, at 95 n.2.
For the failure to acknowledge the performative role of a particular provision, see
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 146 (interpreting the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment without considering what that provision
was doing but instead only articulating certain elements of the semantic meaning of
such provision).
103
The conflation appears in a number of respects. For example, the interpretive
methods that originalists employ make no distinction between the use of language in
the Constitution as performative statements and the use of such language in declarative
statements. Yet that linguistic use would appear different in important ways.
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Amendment, he has analyzed it as if it were a declarative sentence.104 Lost in
that approach is the recognition that what a performative text does may not be
simply a matter of the semantic or linguistic meanings of the words that
comprise it. The performative role of the Confrontation Clause is to establish
a framework for the introduction of testimonial evidence against individual
criminal defendants. 105 That framework is focused upon the rights of the
accused, guaranteeing her the right to be confronted by witnesses against
her. 106 But implicitly it at least balances against that right the authority of the
State to conduct criminal prosecutions. This abstract description does not shed
much light on the particular questions about the scope and application of the
Clause that have arisen.
If we consider some of those questions that have bedeviled the Court, like
the treatment of vulnerable children testifying as to abuse claims, however,
attention to the performative role sheds some light on understanding how to
apply the Clause. 107 As I have noted before, the Clause’s text is written in the
passive voice; it speaks of being confronted with, rather than confronting,
adverse witnesses. 108 The obvious question is whether that choice of voice is
significant. If so, then the identification of the witness and the right to crossexamine such witnesses and impeach their testimony may satisfy the Clause.
That reading might find support in the Clause’s performative role in
establishing the framework for what qualifies as a fair criminal trial that
adequately limits the State’s exercise of its sovereign power and protects the
accused. The performative dimension of the constitutional text reminds us
what is being done and calls for a reading that comports with that mission.
If confronted with such a performative analysis, it is likely that the
originalists would be generally inclined to reject it. Classically, the rejection
of a performative analysis was couched in terms of rejecting an interpretation

104

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–54 (2004) (Scalia, J.); see also
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 43–44 (writing in the period between when
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (permitting child witnesses to testify by video
in abuse cases) was decided and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
(reversing Maryland v. Craig, and requiring testimony to be given in person in the
courtroom), Justice Scalia argued for a more robust reading of the right of
confrontation).
105
By focusing on individual criminal defendants I am simply putting to one side
potentially more complex questions about the rights of non-individual defendants.
106
U.S. CONST. amend VI.
107
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990) (“We have of course recognized
that a State’s interest in ‘the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further
trauma and embarrassment’ is a ‘compelling’ one.”).
108
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31,
at 280 n.79.
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based upon the purposes 109 or intentions 110 of the authors. But the appeal to
the performative element in the constitutional text ought not to be conflated
with appeals to purpose and intent. The performative element arises as an
independent matter of social fact, without regard to subjective purposes or
intentions. As explored in the prior paragraph, a performative analysis can
proceed smoothly without any analysis of authors’ intentions and purposes.
Yet this performative analysis is not easily assimilated into originalist
theory. Even Larry Solum, for example, who has recognized the performative
element of the constitutional text, 111 nevertheless adopts a narrow linguistic
focus in his analysis of constitutional law. 112 For Solum, the performative
element of constitutional law is a very thin concept and functions only to
capture the implicature of the constitutional texts.113
Solum either
misunderstands or rejects a performative account of the constitutional text that
focuses on what the constitutional text is to do. He does not endorse an account
of the linguistic content of the Constitution that includes its political and social
performative role. 114 Instead, he ultimately returns to an account only of its
linguistic content that focuses on the semantic import of the text. 115
B. New Originalism and The Concept of Constitutional Construction
Critics have challenged the interpretative claims of classical originalism
by asserting that some constitutional provisions are such that the prospect of
109
See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 144 (asserting that the
public understanding of the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text controls, not
the expected or anticipated legal implications arising from the adoption of that text).
110
See, e.g., BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 3.
111
See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 102, at 31–37.
112
See id.
113
Id. at 36.
114
For example, Solum’s account of constitutional construction is one of
translating semantic content to legal content. If we consider how Solum would
approach the classic textual puzzle of who would preside over the impeachment trial
of the Vice President, it is hard to see how his semantic originalism would sort through
the various sources of legal content in the constitutional text. One obvious, ordinary
implicature of the provision of Article I, Section 3, clause 6 that the Chief Justice
presides over the impeachment trial of the president is that he presides over only that
trial. The general provision of Article I Section 3 that the Vice President presides over
the Senate would then appear to apply, yielding the implausible conclusion that the
Vice President would preside over her own impeachment trial. It is unclear that
Solum’s semantic originalism provides us tools to lead to a more sensible result and
more plausible application of the Constitution. Solum has missed the performative
role of the Constitution. He cannot get the right reading because he won’t
acknowledge the fundamental performative role of the constitutional text.
115
Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 102, at 31–37.
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finding a unique interpretation appears problematic. 116 They challenge the
originalist stance as simplistic. 117 New Originalism has responded to this
criticism, at least in part, by introducing the distinction between constitutional
interpretation and constitutional construction. 118 New Originalism tempers its
commitment to the priority of interpretation by acknowledging the noninterpretative role of constitutional construction. 119 Construction is proposed
as the method to elucidate the meaning of constitutional provisions sufficiently
indeterminate to admit of interpretation. 120
This distinction begins with the constitutional text and the distinction
between constitutional provisions that ought to be interpreted from those that
ought to be construed. 121 The originalists who draw the distinction between
interpretation and construction argue that it is grounded on a distinction
between two kinds of meaning that constitutional texts have. 122 Some
constitutional texts have determinate meanings; the constitutional text has a
specificity that employs general terms with known and agreed upon
meanings. 123 For those provisions, the task in constitutional appellate
116
See Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 83–87 (arguing that there are different
types of constitutional provisions as a matter of interpretation). See generally TRIBE
& DORF, READING, supra note 9 at 8–13 (arguing against originalism that instead of
treating the original understanding of the text of the Constitution as controlling we
ought to treat the principle inherent in the text as determinative—as we now
understand that principle).
117
Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 83–87.
118
Solum, Distinction, supra note 12; Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra
note 5; Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 13; Randy Barnett,
Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 65 (2011) [hereinafter
Barnett, Interpretation]; WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note
88 (defending a theory of constitutional construction that characterizes construction as
a political process); WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note
55; Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 102; BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23.
119
Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra note 5; Solum, Distinction, supra note
12.
120
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 5–7
(deploying construction when we confront a constitutional provision with “an
impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered.”); Barnett,
Interpretation, supra note 118; Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 13;
Solum, Distinction, supra note 118, at 103 (“Conceptually, construction gives legal
effect to the semantic content of a legal text.”).
121
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7
(characterizing the constitutional texts that require construction as “so broad and
underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful reduction to legal rules.”).
122
BARNETT, LOST, supra note 118, at 118–30; WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7.
123
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (president’s minimum age); see also POSNER,
PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 265–66) (offering far-fetched hypothetical alternative
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adjudication is to interpret the provision in the context of the constitutional
controversy at hand. 124 Examples include the provisions that require the
president to be at least 35 years of age, prescribe the oath the president must
swear or affirm, or require revenue bills to originate in the House. 125 On
Whittington’s account, the meaning of the constitutional text is fashioned into
a rule and applied in adjudication. 126
Other constitutional provisions do not have such determinate meanings. 127
The source of the uncertainty derives from the more abstract general terms
employed or because such terms employ essentially contested concepts. 128 For
those provisions interpretation is inadequate to determine how such a provision
is to apply. 129 The linguistic meaning of those provisions must be augmented
to permit constitutional decision. Construction is thus characterized as a
necessary step in constitutional decision.
Somewhat puzzlingly, Whittington gives the example of the nonconstitutional text, “buy a dog,” as an example of a non-interpretable text. 130
He asserts that while the broad parameters of this text are knowable, many
questions of meaning remain because a reader would not know what kind of
dog to buy, what color of dog to buy, or how old a dog to buy. 131 Although
Whittington does not carry his claim quite so far, it may be that unless the text
made clear which dog to buy, when to buy it, who to buy it from, and how
much to pay for it, the text would require construction. Whittington treats
these unanswered questions as to the application of the text as questions of the
meaning of the text, rather than questions about how a general rule or text is
to be applied, but he does not explain why. 132

readings of the requirement of the constitutional text to support the conclusion that the
rule stated by the constitutional text has a certain crystalline clarity).
124
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 118, at 6.
125
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (revenue bills); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (form of
presidential inaugural oath); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (president’s minimum age).
126
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 6.
127
BARNETT, LOST, supra note 88, at 123 (giving the example of constitutional
provisions like the Due Process Clause that employ abstract terms); WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7.
128
See generally W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1956) (arguing that certain concepts are not merely
controversial as to their meaning in marginal or extreme cases but are inherently
controversial as their meaning and application).
129
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7.
130
Id. at 7. It is not entirely clear whether he means the text in its declarative sense,
as in a narrative, or in its performative sense as an instruction or command.
131
Id.
132
Id.
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Two arguments help make clear how questionable Whittington’s claim
is. 133 First, let us concede that the text is an instruction or command and that
the task is one of understanding or acting on that instruction or command. Let
us also concede that we have no context for the instruction or command. The
hypothetical does not tell us anything more about the author, the person to
whom the text was addressed, or the relationship of the two individuals.
Consider the case if the individual to whom the text was addressed
expeditiously purchases a St. Bernard puppy. Has the individual satisfied the
instruction or command? Could the author properly claim, “that is not what I
meant!!”? The buyer has bought a dog. She has done what the instruction or
command requires. The subject is a dog, the act is a purchase, and she is the
agent. I do not think any more semantic or linguistic analysis is easily
available.134 She has done what the instruction instructs, consistent with its
meaning. The course taken was not the only course of action that would have
satisfied the instruction or command of the text (the particular act was not a
unique qualifying act), but it is sufficient to satisfy the instruction.
The speaker may well be right, of course, that he did not mean that, but
only if at least one of two conditions are satisfied. First, he may not have said
what he meant, so there could easily have been a disconnect between the
language employed and the meaning intended on his side. Second, the context
denied to us in the hypothetical might provide context and pragmatics that
impose additional constraints on which acts satisfy the instruction, taking into
account its full meaning and import. The speaker might be the agent’s partner,
and the two might live in poverty in a walk-up studio apartment in Brooklyn.
In that context, a number of reasons militate against the selection of a St.
Bernard puppy as the dog to buy. In that case, the speaker would be entitled
to characterize the action taken as inconsistent with the meaning of the
instruction given.
Second, on Whittington’s account it does not appear that we can have texts
with general terms that can be understood and applied without further
choice. 135 Ironically, given Whittington’s originalism, this appears to be a
restatement of Tribe’s claim that there is a problem of generality. 136 That
appears to be the implication of his account of the uncertainty of meaning of
his example. That seems implausible as a general claim. General statements,
general performatives, and general rules are just that. They do not always have
133

See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 11.
The hypothetical eliminates the elements that might provide additional
pragmatics of meaning.
135
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 2 (“The
need to interpret [the Constitution] is taken as the starting point for theory . . . .
Interpretation is the touchstone of judicial authority.”).
136
See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 16, at 80–87. See generally
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, §§ 198–202.
134
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suppressed specifications. 137 When the traffic ordinance provides a speed limit
of 55 miles per hour, we do not have to ask how fast we should go or when
going as fast as the speed limit allows is imprudent or even unlawful to
understand the meaning of the ordinance. The vast literature about meaning,
ambiguity, and precision in the law and in philosophy simply does not support
Whittington’s claim. 138
I have previously explored the philosophical arguments against the claim
that following a rule requires an interpretation. 139 Whittington does not make
any new argument for this claim. It is as untenable in his hands as in Tribe’s.
The criticisms that I have previously sketched as to why there is not a problem
of generality also apply to Whittington’s claim that a constitutional rule
requires an interpretation before it can be applied. Constitutional rules are like
other rules; they can be applied without first interpreting them. Any contrary
position invites the infinite regress that Wittgenstein identified and employed
to construct a reductio against the argument that the application of a rule must
begin with an interpretation of the rule.
Whittington might argue (although he fails to do so expressly) that
constitutional rules are principles and, as such, are not simply characterized as
rules in the sense that Wittgenstein explores. Perhaps to follow a principle
requires an interpretation in ways that following simpler rules does not. On
this argument, we can simply understand rules and understand how to apply
them. Principles are more complicated, freighted with more inferential
content, and in need of a determinative interpretation before they can be
137
There is no persuasive reason to argue that there are such suppressed
specifications than in other premises employed in our practical reasoning. See ROBERT
BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFERENTIALISM 84–89
(2000) [hereinafter BRANDOM, INFERENTIALISM] (arguing against Davidson’s account
of practical reasoning that imputes suppressed premises to the argument used).
138
See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125–26 (1961) [hereinafter
HART, CONCEPT]; ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 85–105 (2014)
[hereinafter MARMOR, LANGUAGE]; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) [hereinafter Brest, Misconceived Quest]
(exploring the classical example of the prohibition of vehicles in the park); SCOTT
SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special about Law, in 1
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT IS AND HOW WE USE IT 403
(2009) [hereinafter SOAMES, Legal Texts] (arguing that understanding legal texts is not
fundamentally different from understanding other texts and that both require attention
to sources of linguistic content that go beyond the semantic content that typically is
the only source considered in the legal academy); Solum, Distinction, supra note 118.
139
See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31, at 320–26 (criticizing
Tribe’s claim that there is a systemic problem of generality in constitutional
interpretation); LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 32,
at 113 n.92 (arguing that Wittgenstein’s analysis of following a rule explains why there
is no problem of generality).
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applied. 140 It may therefore appear that we need an interpretation of a principle
before it can be applied while we need no such interpretation for a rule.
Wittgenstein’s examples of rule following are generally directed toward rather
mechanical rules. 141
But on reflection those arguments are equally powerful against
constitutional law, whether characterized as rules or as principles. To see that
principles may be applied without first endorsing an interpretation, consider a
constitutional principle like that of the Fourteenth Amendment that of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 142 How could such an
abstract and seemingly indeterminate provision be applied without an
interpretation? To put it another way, how could we apply that provision with
respect to a challenge to segregated public schools unless we had a view
whether Plessy or Brown was the right way to read the clause? If so, aren’t
those readings interpretations of the clause? If we have such an interpretation
or reading, aren’t we then able to apply the principle in constitutional
adjudication?
Certainly, if principles are the way that Dworkin describes them, they
cannot be applied as rules. 143 The generality with which principles are stated
appears to invite elaboration or specification, if not interpretation, before
application. But if a principle requires an interpretation before it may be
applied, then is the infinite regress argument that was developed against the
claim that finding an interpretation of a rule is logically prior to the application
of a rule also applicable here? These are complex questions, and I want to
remain agnostic about their answers here. How a constitutional principle is
employed in constitutional reasoning and decision is more complex than
simply functioning as a rule. It may be that there is a process that leads from
a principle to a rule and then to decision; it may be that such a process involves
interpretation. Or it may be that the role of principles is quite different and
involves neither intermediate rules nor interpretations. Principles may be a
shorthand indicating the kinds of arguments that are relevant, for example. In
any case, Whittington does not articulate the process of reasoning in his
description of the difference between interpretation and construction.
Other New Originalists take a different approach to the distinction
between interpretation and construction. Randy Barnett rejects Whittington’s
characterization of the project of construction as political, in part because he

140

Such a claim may find support in Dworkin’s distinction between rules and
principles, the latter being more open ended and less determinate. See DWORKIN,
Rules I, supra note 29, at 22.
141
See WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, §§ 201–
231 (offering several examples of rules that generate numerical sequences).
142
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
143
DWORKIN, Rules I, supra note 29, at 22.
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wants to create a role for natural rights theory in constitutional construction. 144
On his account, the underdetermined constitutional text is to be rendered more
specific by making choices that are at once consistent with the linguistic
meaning of the constitutional text and with constitutional principles inherent,
but unarticulated, in the constitutional text. 145 The most obvious principles
that Barnett calls out are federalism and the separation of powers.146 Barnett
would presumably not include Ely’s principle of democracy enhancement as
such a principle, but it is not entirely clear why. 147
Jack Balkin classifies construction as a discrete form of interpretation, to
be contrasted with interpretation as ascertainment. 148 For Balkin, construction
is necessary when the meaning of a provision cannot be simply ascertained. 149
This can happen when the constitutional text is simply too abstract, or when
we must look to the principles inherent in the Constitution in much the same
way that Barnett would do. 150 Thus, on Balkin’s account, construction is
required when the constitutional text states a principle rather than a rule.151
For those provisions expressing principles, Balkin asserts that the Constitution
contemplates and demands an articulation and application of that principle. 152
Balkin’s constructive tools partially track Bobbitt’s canonical modes of
constitutional argument, and he references Bobbitt’s account. 153 Balkin does

144

BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23, at 122 (finding the task of construction in the
gap between abstract constitutional texts and the requirements for legal rules).
145
Id. at 128.
146
Id.
147
Including such a principle would give the Court and Congress broad power to
intrude into the States’ management and control of the electoral process in ways that
appear inconsistent with Barnett’s limited, libertarian state. But it would not generally
give the federal government the regulatory powers that Barnett finds most troubling.
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST] (offering a classic if
limited defense of the controversial decisions of the Warren Court on the basis that the
Constitution seeks to enhance democratic decision making and that it often falls to the
Court to carry out this principle).
148
JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM] (asserting that construction is generally treated as a form of
interpretation).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 5–6; BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23, at 122–25 (describing the process of
articulating constitutional principles to inform the process of constitutional
construction).
151
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 148, at 6–7.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 4. For Bobbitt’s catalog of his canonical modes of constitutional
argument see BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 7–8.
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not treat construction as a political project.154 Instead, construction is
accomplished through techniques that articulate a constitutional principle
expressed by the text, but in doing so interpret the constitutional principle in
the contemporary world with our contemporary understandings—and
contemporary values. 155
Balkin expressly contrasts his originalist approach with more traditional
originalist approaches like that defended by Justice Scalia.156 The critical
difference between the two originalisms is that Balkin asserts that the openended provisions articulating principles were designed and intended to
delegate the future participants in the Republic’s constitutional decisionmaking the specification of these principles. 157 Construction is thus the means
to narrow the gap between originalism and its critics who endorse a Living
Constitution—hence, Living Originalism.
The New Originalists propose a variety of techniques to supply the
additional legal content for such provisions to provide the requisite guidance
for decision. 158 Whittington claims that such terms cannot be given meaning
by the courts because determining the meaning of such uninterpretable
provisions requires political choices to be made. 159 Political, in this context,
means that normative choices must be made between competing claims with
disparate impact on various members of political society. 160 In our democratic
Republic, those choices are to be made through the democratic political
process. Barnett’s methods of construction look to the principles inherent in
the Constitution. 161 But those principles are strongly libertarian and sharply

154

BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 148, at 5–8.
Id. at 7.
156
Id. Balkin, like Dworkin, asserts that Justice Scalia endorsed an original
application originalism rather than an original understandings originalism. Id. This
claim, whatever its merits, is a red herring.
157
Id.
158
Compare WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 118, at
1–15 (characterizing construction as a matter of making political choices) with
BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23, at 122 (characterizing construction by its role in
advancing the process of adjudication and emphasizing the natural rights dimension
of much of that project) and BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 148, at 3–6
(following Barnett in emphasizing the necessary role of construction in constitutional
decision but without the natural rights dimension).
159
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 118, at 7
(“[C]onstitutional construction is essentially political.”); WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 118, at 1–15.
160
See generally WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note
118, at 1 (expressly referring to the construction of constitutional law through the
“political melding of the [Constitution] with external interests and principles”).
161
BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23.
155
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critical of the modern administrative state, which is now a part of the
Republic. 162
As explored above, Jack Balkin adopts a third method of construction,
purportedly attending to principles inherent in the Constitution and the
Republic that it constitutes. 163 The Constitution that Balkin constructs is very
different from Barnett’s, however, because his method takes a favorable stance
toward the modern administrative state of the Republic. 164 Balkin articulates
a somewhat different limitation on the role of interpretation.165 When the
constitutional text is express and its meaning can be made clear through
interpretation, Balkin privileges that interpretation as a ground for
constitutional decision. 166 He does so on the basis that only the original
meaning of the constitutional text preserves the foundation for the structure of
the Republic that the Constitution has created. 167
One question about the distinction between provisions that require
interpretation and those that require construction is how clear the line between
the two must be. Even proponents of the concept of construction acknowledge
that the line separating it from interpretation may blur.168 One possible
response to my criticism is that I am simply asking for the distinction between
construction and interpretation to be crystalline in a way that it is not and need
not be. I do not mean to assert here that an imprecise line is no line. The
argument I mean to make against the distinction between interpretation and
construction is that no such distinction appears tenable. The distinction is
untenable because the need for interpretation or construction is not determined
by the nature of the language of the constitutional text.
The ontological distinction between the two classes of provisions has an
epistemological corollary: we can distinguish the two classes with sufficient
confidence to deploy the appropriate constitutional decision tools appropriate
for the particular category into which any particular provision falls. The New
Originalists sometimes seem to suggest this classification is obvious because
they do not pause to articulate how the distinction is to be drawn. 169 On this
account, the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment are manifestly abstract, requiring articulation
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Id.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 148, at 5.
164
Id.
165
See id. at 4–5.
166
Id. at 14.
167
Id. at 35–36.
168
BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23, at 128.
169
See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 118,
at 7; Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 12; Solum, Distinction,
supra note 12, at 7; Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 12.
163
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before they can be applied in particular cases; the requirement that the
president be at least 35 years in age, by contrast, carries a precise meaning.
The New Originalists all argue or assume that the distinction between
construction and interpretation is semantically sound and epistemologically
accessible. 170 Armed with that distinction, the New Originalists argue that the
criticism of classical originalism for implausibly assuming that all
constitutional texts were interpretable and, therefore, “easy to discern and
simple to apply,” 171 has been disarmed. But that claim relies upon the
distinction being adequately drawn and knowable by constitutional judges. I
will explore the critics’ response to those claims below.
C. The Critics’ Response
Originalism’s critics sometimes share originalism’s commitment to the
priority and primacy of interpretation in their account of constitutional
decision. 172 But when they do, they generally employ a different notion of
interpretation. 173 Dworkin asserts the priority and primacy of interpretation in
constitutional decision. In Dworkin’s account of interpretation, the law,
including constitutional law, is interpreted in a manner that maintains its
integrity while also taking into account the normative judgments of our best
moral theory. 174 Thus, Dworkin’s project of interpretation is very different
than that of the originalist. But it is not only Dworkin’s idiosyncratic concept
of interpretation that is different from that of the originalists. Laurence Tribe
also adopts very different methods of constitutional interpretation. 175

170

If the distinction were not semantically sound and knowable, it could not do the
task to which it is put: distinguishing constitutional provisions that may be given
determinate meaning through interpretation and those that require the more openended techniques of construction. The originalists must assume those features in the
absence of argument.
171
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 45.
172
See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 73–80 (describing the problem
of generality). But see BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 7–8 (describing a typology
of constitutional argument with several forms going beyond interpretation);
PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 9, at 135–38 (endorsing a modal account of
constitutional argument); Sunstein, Nothing, supra note 4 (arguing that substantive
normative choices must be made among competing kinds of constitutional interpretive
methods before those methods can be employed to produce readings of the
Constitution).
173
As noted above, my focus is not on the pragmatist claims of the critics.
174
See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 96–98.
175
See generally TRIBE, INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 9; TRIBE &
DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 6–13.
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Tribe’s theory of constitutional interpretation is difficult to capture
precisely, as he effectively acknowledges. 176 Unlike some substantively
similar constitutional theorists, Tribe appears to believe that constitutional
decision begins with interpretation of the Visible Constitution. 177 Most
fundamentally, he argues that multiple interpretative methods must be
deployed to work with the disparate types of constitutional provisions. 178 His
slogan, “Integration without hyper-integration,” captures his interpretative
aspirations. 179 Tribe’s methods of interpretation are, in substantial part, a
response to his claim that interpretation faces a threshold question of
determining the generality at which to interpret a constitutional provision. 180
The less general, more specific constitutional provisions are easier to interpret.
For these specific provisions, understanding their semantic meaning is often
enough. 181 For the more general, aspirational provisions, by contrast, the
Court’s task is somewhat harder. For those provisions, Tribe urges that
interpretation requires a normative judgment or choice. 182 That normative
judgment is based upon extra-constitutional sources. Tribe argues that our
contemporary understandings inform the interpretation and application of
these open-ended constitutional provisions. 183 He gives the example of Brown
v. Board of Education’s consideration of the question whether segregated
public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause. 184 Conceding that the
Clause was not understood at the time of adoption to prohibit such schools, he
concludes easily that by 1954 the application of the Clause to prohibit such
segregation was a correct interpretation and application. 185
Originalism’s critics have been generally unimpressed by the New
Originalists’ introduction of the interpretation/construction distinction.186
They have argued that the distinction has little changed the evidence adduced

176

Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 72–73 (acknowledging that his theory of
constitutional interpretation cannot be reduced to a “sound bite”).
177
TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 71–73, 72 (“[I]t is primarily in the
interpretation of prior cases that the battle for constitutional meaning is joined.”).
178
Id. at 30 (citing Walt Whitman to emphasize the fundamental tensions, if not
inconsistencies, inherent in the Constitution).
179
TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 58–60. But see TRIBE, INVISIBLE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9.
180
Id. at 73–80.
181
Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 77 (“[S]ome parts of the Constitution
cannot plausibly be open to significantly different interpretations.”).
182
Id. at 87–94.
183
Id.
184
TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 12–13.
185
Id.
186
See, e.g., Tushnet, New Originalism, supra note 13.
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for originalist interpretations. 187 There is substantial reason to question the
epistemic claim that we can distinguish those provisions that may be
interpreted and those that require construction. 188 The first reason is that the
sources of uncertainty for the constitutional texts are contingent and historical;
they evolve over time. Thus, for example, the meaning of the Second
Amendment likely appeared to be well-settled prior to District of Columbia v.
Heller 189 and, certainly, prior to the academic revisionist analysis beginning in
the late 1980’s. 190 The first clause of the Amendment was read as limiting the
right; the scope of the constitutional right to bear arms was therefore quite
narrow. 191 The constitutional text needed only interpretation, not construction.
Today, in light of Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, 192 which read the first
clause only as prefatory and without limiting effect, construction seems
required to articulate the limits of constitutional firearm regulation.193 The
Court has recognized that the right to bear arms is not absolute, either as to the
kind of arms permitted or the locations to which they may be carried but
articulating the relevant limits—which appears to require a normative choice
for which the constitutional text provides little guidance—appears to be a
matter of construction.
Second, moreover, the sources of uncertainty and ambiguity are varied,
and are not identifiable simply by inspecting the kinds of terms used in the
relevant provision. The judgment as to the classification of a particular text,
and the methods properly available to a judge facing a case as to which the text
appears relevant must look beyond the linguistic meaning of the text to the
performative role the text plays to determine how to approach it. This
approach will turn on the constitutional doctrine that has arisen, the precedents
187

Tushnet, New Originalism, supra note 13, at 612 (“[P]roponents of the new
originalism acknowledge, or at least should acknowledge, that nearly everything
examined by old originalists is relevant to the new originalist inquiry.”).
188
Laurence Tribe made this point forcefully at Princeton in criticism of both
Dworkin and Justice Scalia. Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 72 (“Both [Scalia
and Dworkin] err, I think, in the confidence of their conclusions . . . .”).
189
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (striking down the
District of Columbia firearms regulatory statute while affirming that certain kinds of
regulation would be permissible).
190
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 637 (1989) [hereinafter Levinson, Second Amendment] (calling out the legal
academy’s virtual disregard of the Second Amendment and suggesting that the
Amendment might have more substance than had been generally acknowledged).
191
Justice Scalia acknowledged this established reading of the Second Amendment
in his Tanner Lectures at Princeton. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at
43 (suggesting that the Second Amendment would be found to guarantee only the right
of the states to maintain a national guard).
192
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S 742 (2010).
193
Id.; Heller, 554 U.S. at 573–78.
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that may be relevant, and prudential concerns that may be applicable to the
case at bar. In some cases, a reading that is supported by a seemingly powerful
interpretation will be unpersuasive because of extratextual concerns, be they
structural, doctrinal, or prudential, for example. There can be no algorithm to
tell a judge when interpretation is enough and when construction is
necessary. 194
The introduction of the concept of constitutional construction and the
powerful role it has been accorded by its proponents has been criticized even
by originalists. 195 Richard Kay argues that the claim that construction is
necessary to articulate constitutional authority outside the Constitution is
mistaken. 196 According to Kay, the Constitution incorporates the source of all
constitutional law. 197 Kay asserts that constitutional construction need not
draw upon extra constitutional sources both because recourse to such authority
is unnecessary and because it is impermissible as a matter of constitutional
theory. 198 He holds that it is unnecessary because it is apparently made
necessary only by the excessively restrictive conditions that the New
Originalism places on interpretation. 199 If we adopt interpretative methods that
go beyond the narrow set permitted by New Originalism and consider not
merely what was understood to be meant by the constitutional language but
was understood to be done by the text, then it will be possible to answer a
broader range of questions. 200 Here, I think Kay is right; in my terms, he is
proposing interpreting the Constitution as a performative text. It is
impermissible because the purportedly originalist proponents of construction
acknowledge that it creates binding constitutional law beyond that understood
at the time the Constitution was adopted and the relevant amendment was
passed. 201 That accretion is inconsistent with originalism.

194
This is a corollary of the anti-foundational pluralist account of constitutional
law I have defended elsewhere. See generally André LeDuc, The Anti-Foundational
Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of the Debate over Originalism, 119 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 131 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge].
195
Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra note 5.
196
Id. at 14–25.
197
Id. at 2 (“For the purposes of constitutional adjudication, the Constitution is
complete.”).
198
Id. at 23–25; see also SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 44–45
(arguing against looking beyond the original understanding of the constitutional text
to moral theory because of the indeterminacy that would result in constitutional law).
199
Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra note 5, at 12–13.
200
Id. at 13–15.
201
Id. at 11–12.
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Moreover, most of originalism’s critics do not disagree with the central
and foundational role accorded interpretation by originalism. 202 Most
dramatically, Ronald Dworkin argues that law is interpretation.203 By this he
means that constitutional decision is a matter of forging the best interpretation
of the authoritative sources of law, taking into account not only traditional
legal authorities but also moral theory. 204 Dworkin doesn’t disagree with the
originalists about the priority of interpretation; he disagrees with them about
the interpretation that they defend. 205 Similarly, Tribe endorses the priority of
interpretation in constitutional analysis, as a matter of understanding and
decision. 206 Again, he doesn’t disagree as to the place and role of
interpretation; he disagrees about the interpretation defended by
originalism, 207 as well as the interpretative method defended by originalism. 208
Importantly, for example, Tribe asserts that the originalists are committed to
the proposition that the Constitution may be interpreted within its four corners,
and that this claim is false. 209 Instead, Tribe holds that interpreters must bring
to the task of interpretation extraneous material. 210 But Tribe does not
challenge the claim that the project of constitutional understanding and
decision begins with interpretation. 211
Not all critics of originalism share the premise that interpretation is
logically prior to constitutional decision, however. 212 The pragmatists assign
priority to prudential considerations in decision, so that the consequences of
decision are paramount instead of the interpretations that may be articulated
with respect to a constitutional text. 213 Philip Bobbitt and Dennis Patterson
have challenged the priority accorded interpretation by the originalists and
their critics on the grounds that the practices that comprise law are the

202

E.g. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18; Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at
65–66.
203
See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18.
204
Id. at 240–50.
205
See generally Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 115–27.
206
Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 65–66.
207
Id. at 65–72.
208
Id. at 66.
209
See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 81–87.
210
Id. at 82–87.
211
Id. at 14–15 (emphasizing the need for principles of interpretation with which
to anchor the meaning of the Constitution).
212
Michael Moore has challenged the priority accorded interpretation on the
grounds that interpretative claims carry embedded ontological and other philosophical
claims. See generally Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 14.
213
See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4.
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discourse of arguments made within the constraints of accepted modes. 214 On
that account, argument, not interpretation, is the path to decision. 215 Moreover,
not all arguments are made on the basis of anything that can easily be cast as
an interpretation. 216
Nevertheless, originalism and most of its critics share the premise that
constitutional decision requires, as a condition precedent, an interpretation of
the constitutional text, and much of the debate over originalism has unfolded
on that ground. 217 Both sides accord a logical priority to interpretation. 218 The
claim that interpretation is prior to constitutional decision is not
uncontroversial and is likely mistaken. The interpretive premise of originalism
and most of its critics is subject to three criticisms. First, originalism’s
commitment to the logical priority of interpretation may be challenged.
Second, the claim that appellate constitutional adjudication, after the facts have
been found, is exclusively a matter of interpretation may be challenged. Third,
the claim that constitutional law is a fundamentally or exclusively a text that
is to be interpreted in adjudication may also be rejected. I will look at each of
these increasingly radical challenges in turn.
Because of the prevalence of the interpretive model in our contemporary
accounts of constitutional adjudication, the alternatives to that model may not
be immediately apparent. How would constitutional adjudication work if it
did not begin with an interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions?
Application need not be derivative of interpretation. We may simply apply a
rule without need for interpreting it. 219 Making an argument derived from
Wittgenstein’s analysis of rule-following, originalism’s critics rely both upon
our intuitions of what it is like to follow a rule and the more theoretical
arguments that an infinite regress results if we posit that an interpretation of a
rule is required as a precondition for the application of a rule. 220 Applied to
214

See, e.g., BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 88, at 11–22; BOBBITT, FATE,
supra note 14, at 3–8; PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 9, at 151–79; Patterson,
Interpretation, supra note 18.
215
See, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 3–8; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION,
supra note 88, at 11–22.
216
Prudential arguments, for example, are not made on the basis of what the
relevant text says as much as on the basis of what ought to be done. See BOBBITT,
FATE, supra note 14, at 59–73.
217
E.g., DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra,
note 2. See generally Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 14.
218
E.g., DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra,
note 2, at 144–45.
219
See generally WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79,
§§ 83–240.
220
See, e.g., id. (sketching a series of arguments that rule following is an inherently
social phenomenon); G. P. BAKER & P. M. S. HACKER, SCEPTICISM, RULES AND
LANGUAGE (1983) (challenging the attribution of Kripke’s argument to Wittgenstein);
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constitutional adjudication, this analysis would suggest that judges may simply
apply the constitutional rule, and then use the associated opinion to explain
their application. Or, perhaps, judges may merely offer an ex post
interpretation of the rule and its application. What, then, is involved in or
necessary for such an application of the constitutional rule?
Perhaps the judge must simply grasp the constitutional rule. Justice
Black’s self-conscious constitutionalism, purportedly focusing on the “plain
meaning” of the Constitution, 221 and his account of reading the Constitution
and then applying it, may appear to capture the notion that the constitutional
rules may be applied without an intermediated interpretation. The obvious
difficulty with such an account is that the notion of grasping certain kinds of
rules does not appear easily applicable to constitutional rules. My intuition
that such rules are different than the rules that we grasp “in a flash” is not easy
to articulate. While some of those rules appear simple (like the rule for
addition), the model of understanding by an intuitive grasp has a broader scope
in mathematics, for example, and would appear to extend to very complex
mathematical truths (at least for sophisticated and able mathematicians) with
a broader scope. 222 There appear, at least initially, to be very substantial
differences between the nature of the rules of addition, such as those chosen
by Wittgenstein for his examples, and rules of constitutional law. 223 Indeed,
the way mathematicians often describe grasping even very complex and
SAUL KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY
EXPOSITION (1982) (controversial skeptical reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s
discussion of rules, with an express qualification as to whether it ought to be attributed
to Wittgenstein himself).
221
For some appropriate and thoughtful qualifications about endorsing such an
account of Justice Black’s constitutional theory, see ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST,
supra note 147, at 3 (pointing out that Justice Black’s constitutional theory was much
more nuanced and sophisticated than Black presented it to be or than it has been
traditionally recognized to be); Lessig, Translation, supra note 63, at 1165, n.25
(citing several of Justice Black’s important constitutional decisions expressing his
plain meaning theory of constitutional interpretation).
222
The role of sophistication in this account is itself not unproblematic, as George
Hardy’s account of the introduction of the Indian mathematician into England’s
mathematical elite makes clear. See GEORGE H. HARDY, A MATHEMATICIAN’S
APOLOGY (1940); see also MICHAEL HARRIS, MATHEMATICS WITHOUT APOLOGIES
(2015) (contemporary account of work on the frontiers of modern mathematics’
research agenda); REBECCA GOLDSTEIN, THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM (1981) (fictional
account of mathematical intuition). But see NICOLAS BOURBAKI, GENERAL
TOPOLOGY: CHAPTER 1–4 (1998) (indicative example of codifying axiomatic approach
to pure mathematics).
223
See generally WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79,
§§ 198–242 (providing examples of simple rules that are like the rule of addition, such
as the rules of chess and the rule generating the series of odd integers).
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difficult mathematical propositions appears more like grasping addition than
grasping the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. How would a modern judge “grasp” the constitutional
rule against bills of attainder, for example? 224
Justice Black may appear to be a proponent of the position that the import
of the plain meaning can provide the answers to constitutional questions,
without need for interpretation or for argument. 225 But as others have pointed
out, Justice Black’s claim that constitutional decision can proceed in reliance
upon only the text of the Constitution and its plain meaning, doesn’t hold up
even as an account of Justice Black’s own jurisprudence. 226 Even Justice
Black needed a fuller account of the First Amendment, and the scope of the
power of the state to restrict particular classes of speech, despite the apparently
absolute language of the text. 227
One way to capture the discomfort here would be to invoke Dworkin’s
distinction between rules and principles. 228 On Dworkin’s account, principles
are softer, less mechanical, and more powerful than rules. 229 Moreover,
principles are more highly articulated and more reasoned than rules in their
application on that account. 230 The constitutional provisions cited above
appear more like principles than like rules. While we may acknowledge that
rules can be grasped without need for an intermediating interpretation, can we
grasp principles in the same way? The same arguments that Wittgenstein
makes against the view that we need an interpretation of a rule to apply it
would appear applicable to legal principles, too. If we need an interpretation
to apply a principle, then we would appear to need an interpretation of that
interpretation, too. One possible reply would be the argument that principles
work differently from rules, and that we cannot grasp a principle in the same
way we speak of grasping a rule. Principles, on this characterization, cannot
224

Not by reading a law journal note like John Hart Ely’s (even if that permits her
to understand that constitutional rule). See John Hart Ely, The Bounds of Legislative
Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330
(1962). I do not know whether the task would have been less difficult when the
Constitution was adopted.
225
See, e.g., ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 147 (acknowledging
that Justice Black was often viewed as holding such absolute views, but expressing
caution about that attribution).
226
See id. at 3.
227
As has been often pointed out, even Justice Black understood that the absolute
prohibition on laws abridging free speech had exceptions for speech by those serving
in the military and speech in the context of riot or insurrection.
228
See DWORKIN, Rules I, supra note 29, at 22–23.
229
Id. at 22.
230
The abstract status of principles and their provenance in the realm of morality
would appear to explain these differences. See generally id. at 24–28.
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be “grasped” in such a direct manner because of their complexity, softness,
and articulation. Principles, on this account, must be understood through
articulation and in application. It is not enough to apply a principle; it must be
articulable inferentially, explaining the arguments that support it, and
explaining the consequences that follow from it. The role of interpretation on
this account is to tease out this inferential context of the principle; that’s
arguably a different role than the interpretations that have been posited as prior
to and necessary for the interpretation of a rule, and then criticized by
Wittgenstein and others. 231 Working out the implications of, and proper
inferences from, a constitutional text does not appear to be merely a matter of
interpretation. 232
It is also possible that constitutional provisions are neither rules nor
principles. If we bear in mind the performative nature of the Constitution, we
should not be surprised that there are a variety of performative techniques
available. The Constitution may sometimes be understood as providing a
framework within which constitutional rights are to be protected. The First
Amendment prohibition on the enactment of any law abridging the freedom of
the press on this perspective is neither wholly a rule nor wholly a principle. 233
Instead, it is a directive that the rights of a free press are of fundamental
importance. That doesn’t mean it is permissible to cry “Fire!” in a crowded
theater, 234 or that the rights of a free press are to be balanced against other
unidentified values. The artificial dichotomy between rules and principles
doesn’t do justice either to the text of the First Amendment or to the
constitutional doctrine that has evolved thereunder.
Originalists cannot move easily beyond the artificial dichotomy between
rules and principles however, because it would add a complexity to the account
of language at odds with the formalism of their account. Such a distinction
would require an account that describes how interpretation may move from the
constitutional text to the principle inherent in that text. 235 But such a move is
available to critics. If constitutional provisions are not statements of rules or
principles, an alternative characterization may be that they are statements of
231

See, e.g., WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, §§
83–240.
232
On Solum’s account, for example, the task described is a matter of determining
legal content, not interpreting communicative content. Solum, Communicative
Content, supra note 102, at 480–83.
233
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
234
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
235
Of course, this challenge is already present for the originalists with respect to
texts like that of the First Amendment. But originalists have taken pains to adopt
opaque accounts of the interpretative process for such texts. See SCALIA,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 38 (characterizing the First Amendment as “a sort
of synecdoche”).
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aspirations. 236 Another possibility is that the relationship judges have with
constitutional texts is that of making arguments or defending outcomes with
those texts. On this account, which I defend in a companion article in this
series, judges don’t offer interpretations of texts, they offer arguments for
outcomes in constitutional adjudication based upon the text, or perhaps, based
upon other modes of argument. 237 Interpretation is not the end of
constitutional adjudication; it is only one of its means. This is the familiar
radical critique of the anti-representationalists like Bobbitt and Patterson. 238
A final approach toward interpretation has been recently sketched by Cass
Sunstein. 239 Sunstein approaches interpretation from his commitment to
judicial minimalism, intent to disarm interpretation as a method that might
legitimate a more principled approach to constitutional decision. 240 Sunstein
asserts that there are competing models of constitutional interpretation and that
the choice among them—which has implications for the substantive
constitutional doctrine that is derived through interpretation—is itself a
substantive normative choice. 241 Put somewhat simply, there is not a canonical
interpretive method that can derive a neutral constitutional interpretation.
The originalists take as a foundational premise that constitutional appellate
adjudication is principally a matter of interpretation. That premise may be
criticized from a number of vantages, which remain largely unaddressed by
the originalists. I have previously explored the pragmatist challenge, but here
my focus has been upon alternative characterizations of the nature of the
adjudicative activity and of the constitutional text itself. An exclusive
interpretative account of constitutional adjudication is inadequate. First, the
argument for interpretation from the purported logical priority of interpretation
cannot be sustained. Consequences, both in the space of causes and in the
space of reasons, would appear properly part of the Supreme Court’s
deliberative and decisional mission. Second, it is unpersuasive to think that
such considerations in the constitutional sphere have been cabined by the
Constitution to only the amendatory processes of Article V. It is more
plausible that such considerations should be entertained by the Congress in
236

See generally Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 80 (so characterizing the
First Amendment). But see SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 134. In
Dworkin’s theory, while aspirations may shape legal principles, a mere aspiration does
not constitute a legal principle.
237
See generally LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6; LeDuc, AntiFoundational Challenge, supra note 194.
238
See, e.g., BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 88, at 24; PATTERSON, TRUTH,
supra note 9, at 136–38.
239
Sunstein, Nothing, supra note 4.
240
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT
13–34 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING].
241
Sunstein, Nothing, supra note 4, at 193–94.
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legislation and by the Court in adjudication. Third and finally, a more careful
attention to the text of the Constitution and its role in both saying and in doing
also makes a reduction of constitutional adjudication to interpretation
implausible. These arguments are largely unaddressed by originalism, in part
because originalists take the nature of the text and the judicial mission as given
and so accord neither much scrutiny. 242
Interpretation is not logically prior to the application of the Constitution’s
provisions. The Constitution may be applied without interpretation. But that
is not to say that we may dispense with interpretation. Interpretation, both by
the courts and by the commentators, plays a role in our constitutional law.
Interpretations may support arguments and so are an important part of the ways
in which decisions are justified and explained. I explore both of those
constitutional functions in more detail in Striding Out of Babel. 243
Interpretation is an element in our constitutional practice of argument and
justification. It is not, however, logically prior to decision.
Finally, any alternative account of constitutional adjudication that rejects
the priority and primacy of interpretation ought to explain why interpretation
exercises such a powerful appeal as an account of constitutional decision.
Interpretive accounts have a pervasive role in our intellectual culture and the
public space of reason. 244 Interpretation is an established and powerful model
for understanding an array of social practice.245 But the appeal of
interpretation goes beyond those common grounds; the theory of constitutional
decision as beginning with interpretation of the constitutional text has a
particular jurisprudential appeal for many. That appeal is itself grounded in
the ontological premises about the Constitution that the participants in the
debate generally share. 246
III. COMPETING ACCOUNTS OF PRACTICAL REASONING IN OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE
The preceding discussion has explored an account of interpretation that
figures in the originalism debate. This section explores those accounts at a
higher level of abstraction as accounts of constitutional reasoning. We will
see that even when the protagonists share a concept of constitutional decision
as a matter of interpretation, their tacit accounts of constitutional reasoning are
very different.
242

See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 37–38 (diving directly into
the task of interpretation without pausing to place that project of interpretation in any
context of adjudication).
243
LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6.
244
See generally Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 14, at 872–73.
245
See generally id.
246
See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31.
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A. Originalism’s Formal Account of Constitutional Reasoning
Originalism offers a formalistic account of constitutional reasoning. 247 By
formalistic, I mean that the originalist account values stating legal propositions
as rules rather than as principles or standards, 248 and values clear rules, at least
in certain cases, more highly than just outcomes. 249 Clear rules permit
reasonable reliance and planning in socio-legal relations and restrict judicial
discretion. Originalism’s formalism, to the extent it reduces law to rules, faces
obvious challenges when applied to the language of the text of the
Constitution. 250 The linguistic styles of the various provisions of the
Constitution and its Amendments appear to vary significantly. 251 Originalists
have not generally been fair in acknowledging or responding to this
challenge. 252 Originalism’s formalism has two principal components, one
largely tacit, and the other express. First, the tacit premise of originalism is
247

See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 261–65. Some have contraposed
originalism and formalism. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter FARBER & SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING]
(characterizing Bork as an originalist and Justice Scalia as a formalist). That strategy
appears problematic, because both Robert Bork and Justice Scalia, as well as many
other originalists, adopt a formal account of constitutional reasoning and, on the
account defended here, that formalism is an important argument for the stronger claims
of originalism.
248
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rules] (arguing that our concept of the rule of law
incorporates a principle of equal justice pursuant to which justice is rendered not on a
particularized, ad hoc basis but on a uniform basis through the application of general
principles or rules).
249
This is not intended as a novel definition of formalism. For a classic exploration
of formality and formalism in the private law context, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); see also
Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 155 (1981) (“The
formalist theory of adjudication asserts that legal disputes can be, and should be, and
are resolved by recourse to legal rules and principles, and the facts of each particular
dispute.” (footnote omitted)); POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 14–16 (describing
legal formalists as committed to the existence of legal principles underlying the
decisional law which, when identified, can furnish premises for deductive derivations
of the correct answer to new cases).
250
See, e.g., Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 86–89.
251
Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, clauses 5 & 8 (specifying the minimum age
of the President and prescribing the oath that he must swear), with U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII (prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishments”).
But see SCALIA,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 135 (rejecting Tribe’s claim that some constitutional
provisions are “aspirational”).
252
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 134–36.
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that the meaning of constitutional words, and, thus, of constitutional
provisions, is generally straightforward. 253 Originalism offers a formal
account of the linguistic meaning of the Constitution, 254 and assumes that
words picture the world. 255 Originalism’s task is simply to uncover the
semantic understandings at the time of the relevant adoption or amendment of
the constitutional provision. Second, originalism’s account of constitutional
reasoning asserts, expressly, that constitutional reasoning largely follows the
syllogistic reasoning of formal Aristotelian logic.256 This formal account of
constitutional interpretation is defended by originalists in part because of its
promise to deliver a science of interpretation, with the same kinds of
confidence relied upon as the natural sciences. 257
Originalism offers an Aristotelian model of reasoning to characterize the
proper method of judicial reasoning in constitutional interpretation. 258 The
syllogistic model of judicial reasoning begins with the derivation of a major
premise from (the original meaning of) the text of the Constitution. That major
premise typically has the form of a legal principle like: “All X are p.” 259 The
minor premise is furnished from the facts of the case at hand. That minor
premise would typically be of the form “A is an X.” Basic logic yields the
conclusion that decides the case, or states the premise for a further inference.
It follows then that “A is p”, and judgment is rendered. Thus, the Aristotelian
syllogism, constructed in this manner from the constitutional text, is the
paradigm of constitutional adjudication for the originalist.
253
See id. at 45 (“Often—indeed I dare say usually—[the original understanding
of the text] is easy to discern and simple to apply.”). Some of the certainty as to the
meanings of words and texts arises from overlooking the natural and almost instinctive
use of context and implicature to help provide those meanings.
254
See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31.
255
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 3.
256
See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 262. Bork’s originalism might be
defended on the basis that allowances ought to be made for occasional stylistic
excesses. Bork’s characterization of constitutional reasoning as described by formal
logic would be tempered in the same way that his occasional claim that originalism is
necessarily true is best read. But because the formality of Bork’s characterization is
central to his claim for the certainty provided by originalism, it does not appear
possible to excise or reconstruct that claim.
257
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 3 (“The following essay
attempts to explain the current neglected state of the science of construing legal texts,
and offers a few suggestions for improvement.”); see also Richard M. Rorty, The
Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND
SOCIETY 89, 91 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) (“Nobody wants to talk
about a ‘science of law’ anymore.”).
258
See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 162–63.
259
The model of the syllogism is expressly endorsed and adopted by leading
originalists. See id. at 252–57.
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Originalism does not defend its account directly. When Justice Scalia
distinguished the nature of constitutional argument and reasoning from the
common law methods, he does so on the basis that the common law methods
are inconsistent with democratic sovereignty. 260 The argument from
democratic sovereignty is a structural argument, based upon the separation of
powers in the Constitution and the allocation of legislative power to Congress,
with a modest role accorded to the President. On Justice Scalia’s account, the
common law judge makes law in a manner inconsistent with that allocation of
the legislative function to Congress. 261 From that charge, Justice Scalia
concluded that only a formal interpretative method is proper. 262
Justice Scalia’s argument was too facile. First, common law was not
thought to be inconsistent with, or an affront to, the sovereign. 263 Instead,
common law tradition was thought consistent with the authority of the
sovereign because of the principle of separation of powers that no person—
including the sovereign—should be a judge in her own case. 264 Moreover, the
survival of the common law tradition and practice within the constitutional law
of the new democratic republic appears well established. 265 The separation of
powers and the democratic republican structure of the United States was not
understood to circumscribe the role or the reasoning of the courts in the new
nation. 266
Justice Scalia’s conclusion as to the scope of the methods of reasoning
permitted appears unfounded. It is unclear that the interpretative methods to
which Justice Scalia would limit constitutional judges are the only methods
that a sovereign might choose for judges acting on its behalf. The choice
between what a provision was understood to mean and what it was intended to

260

SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 9.
Id.
262
Id.
263
That was in part because common judges were understood to be agents of the
sovereign. See generally GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2010) [hereinafter MCDOWELL,
LANGUAGE OF LAW].
264
See generally id. at 248–52; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (1788) (Alexander
Hamilton).
265
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (describing the common law provenance of the express
protections of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
266
See id.; MCDOWELL, LANGUAGE OF LAW, supra note 263, at 343–78
(describing Justice Story’s central contribution to harmonizing the common law
tradition flowing from Blackstone with the political and legal theory of
constitutionalism).
261
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do, for example, is not an obvious choice for a sovereign. 267 More importantly,
the question of whether to follow the original understanding of a provision or
to follow what is understood at the time the future decision is made presents a
choice for a sovereign. Similarly, whether to require formal logical reasoning
or to permit a wider array of argument and reasoning also present choices that
do not have obvious answers for a sovereign. Thus, the conclusion that Justice
Scalia wants to draw from his premise appears equally as unsupported as the
premise itself.
The formal account of constitutional reasoning raises a number of
questions as to what counts as proper types of arguments. Are inductive and
empirical arguments and the other kinds of legal arguments made in the
common law proper? Common law reasoning is not formalistic. 268 Reasoning
from analogy, deriving reasoned principles from disparate decisional law, and
generalizing principles to serve as premises for arguments—not necessarily
syllogistic in form—for conclusions as to how a case should be decided are
important in common law. 269 Common law reasoning is inductive and
inferential, 270 and is inconsistent with the formal model of originalism. Justice
Scalia makes one of the clearest statements of the limits of permissible
constitutional argument based upon an argument from a theory of democratic
republican sovereignty. 271 He emphasizes the creative role of common law
arguments: recognizing principles, articulating the direction inherent in a line
of cases, and building a foundation for a decision to make new law. 272
According to Justice Scalia’s argument, common law methods permit judges
to make law. 273 The creative role of judicial decision-making arrogates a lawmaking function to the judiciary that is inconsistent with our democratic
republic, according to Justice Scalia. 274 Thus, anything but the formal mode
of syllogistic argument from the major premises stated by the constitutional
text is improper. 275
267

Original understandings would better capture what a sovereign meant by a
statutory or constitutional provision, but prudential or structural arguments might
produce results more in keeping with what the sovereign would prefer.
268
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 3–9.
269
See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2009).
270
See id.; BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19–21
(1921) (“The sentence of today will make the right and wrong of tomorrow.”); OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881)
(“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”).
271
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 9.
272
Id. at 6–9.
273
Id.
274
Id. at 9.
275
Id. at 37–41.
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The originalists’ formal account of constitutional reasoning thus grounds
its criticism of common law reasoning in constitutional interpretation and
decision. 276 Originalists criticize common law methods as violating the
fundamental political and legal premises of our democratic republic by giving
judges too much power. 277 Originalism’s model looks to the provisions of the
Constitution to provide the major premises for formal logical deductions,
while the minor premise comes from the case at bar.278 By describing
constitutional reasoning as formal in this logical sense, originalism purports to
limit the kinds of arguments that may properly be made in constitutional
argument, the kinds of propositions that may be taken as the starting point for
inferences, and limited the role of judicial judgment in constitutional
decision. 279 Thus, the formal account of constitutional reasoning provides a
key element for the originalist project of cabining judicial discretion.
The formality of originalism and the model of syllogistic reasoning does
not appear an accurate description of the legal reasoning in constitutional
decisions. For example, in Brown, the question before the Court was whether
segregated public schools violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 280 Certainly, the Court did not approach the question
as if the major premise of the syllogism was clear and only the minor premise
was to be determined. 281 Rather, the Court’s argument was more informal and
it was cognizant that a finding for the plaintiff would likely run counter to the
expectations of those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. 282
Moreover, originalism’s account of constitutional reasoning is not easily
reconciled with the methodology that the originalists actually deploy. Even in
strongly originalist opinions like the Court’s in Heller 283 and Citizens
United, 284 the dissent in Boumediene, 285 and the concurrence in Adarand

276

See id. at 13–14.
Id. at 9–14.
278
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 46; BORK, TEMPTING, supra
note 7, at 261–64.
279
See Fried, Judgment, supra note 34 (emphasizing the role of judgment in
constitutional adjudication and the necessity to account for that important role in our
constitutional theory).
280
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
281
Id. at 492–96.
282
Id. at 492–93 (Warren, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court) (asserting that the
case must be decided on the basis of the realities of free public education at the time
of decision).
283
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Scalia, J., writing for the
majority).
284
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Kennedy, J., writing for the
majority).
285
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
277
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Constructors, 286 the reasoning cannot be easily reduced to, or translated into,
a series of syllogisms. 287 Instead, the reasoning is far more fluid and informal,
and far more casually inferential in its argument. 288
In Heller, the Court tested a stringent District of Columbia firearm
regulatory regime under the Second Amendment. 289 It is not easy to assimilate
the reasoning of that case to a syllogism. 290 The Court first articulated what
the Second Amendment meant. 291
After examining the subsequent
interpretation of the Second Amendment, including the Court’s own
precedents, the Court applied the Second Amendment to the District of
Columbia ordinance in question. 292 The argument of the opinion advanced a
long series of propositions, which are not easily restated in syllogistic form. 293

286

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment).
287
The difficulty in reducing the argument to such a series of syllogisms arises
from the more complex structure of the argument itself, as articulated by Stephen
Toulmin and Dennis Patterson, and also from the tacit premises that are accepted both
by the Court and by its intended audience. The structure of the argument is neither as
explicit nor as simple as a series of syllogisms might suggest.
288
Moreover, much such practical reasoning also employs modal and probabilistic
elements. See generally DONALD DAVIDSON, How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?,
in DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 36–40 (1980) (defending an
account of the logical structure of practical reasoning to account for akratic action);
CARL G. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1965).
289
Heller, 554 U.S. at 573.
290
Id. at 577. The Court announced a series of key premises without argument or
defense, proceeding to rely on, and reason from, those premises. Thus the Court stated
that “[t]he Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts” and that “[l]ogic
demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and the command.” Id. Note
that the text of the Second Amendment hardly states that the first clause states the
purpose of the Amendment and that whatever may explain the relationship of the two
clauses, it is not logic, as ordinarily understood.
291
Id. at 576–603.
292
Id. at 628–35.
293
Propositions asserted by the Court in Heller that apparently factored into the
holding (and thus are not mere dicta) include:
HP1: The Second Amendment is divided into two parts.
HP2: One part is its “prefatory clause.”
HP3: One part is its “operative clause.”
HP4: The Second Amendment could be restated: “Because X, Y.”
HP5: The prefatory clause structure is unique in the Constitution.
HP6: The prefatory clause structure was common in “other legal
documents.”
HP7: The prefatory clause structure was particularly common in
individual-rights provisions of contemporaneous state constitutions.
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For example, when the Court asserts that the Second Amendment has a
“prefatory clause” and an “operative clause,” it is not apparent where those
claims came from. 294 Nor is the meaning of those claims apparent, because
HP8: Logic demands the existence of a “link” between the stated purpose
and the command.
HP9: The prefatory clause states the purpose.
HP10: The operative clause states the command.
HP11: The “first salient feature” of the operative clause is that it codifies.
HP12: The operative clause codifies a right.
HP13: The right codified by the operative clause is a right of “the people.”
HP14: The unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights use the locution
“right of the people” in two other contexts.
HP15: One context is the First Amendment.
HP16: One context is the Fourth Amendment. (It is thus unstated that the
unamended Constitution does not use this locution at all.)
HP17: Justice Stevens criticizes the majority for discussing “the
prologue” last.
HP18: If a prologue can be used only to resolve ambiguity in an operative
provision, then it is necessary to determine whether the operative
provision is ambiguous first.
HP19: There exists an argument that: “The prologue should be considered
as ‘one of the factors’ in determining whether the operative provision is
ambiguous.”
HP20: If we considered the prologue as provided by HP19, then we would
reach the same result.
HP21: We would reach the same result because our interpretation of “the
right of the people to keep and bear arms” furthers the purpose of an
effective militia.
HP22: Our interpretation furthers such purpose no less than the dissent’s
interpretation furthers such purpose.
HP23: Our interpretation furthers such purpose more than the dissent’s
interpretation furthers such purpose.
HP24: The Ninth Amendment uses terminology very similar to “right of
the people.”
HP25: All three formulations refer to individual rights.
All of these propositions appear in the first five pages of the sixty-four page slip
opinion. This very incomplete listing of the propositions that would need be taken
into account in the Heller opinion confirms that the opinion does not fall into
syllogistic form. Moreover, as the simplified propositions themselves reveal, they are
far from self-evident or unproblematic. The model of the logical syllogism simply
fails to capture the richness required in hard legal analysis. Even in the hands of Justice
Scalia, it’s not easily possible to reduce legal reasoning to such formality. Holmes’s
pragmatic slogan that the life of the law has been experience, not logic, is captured in
the rich texts of opinions in novel and hard Constitutional questions—even for Justice
Scalia.
294
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
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the import of designating a clause as prefatory or operative in a constitutional
text is novel. Thus, it is not clear how to fit those claims, as conclusions, into
a syllogistic model.
It is also not apparent how such claims fit into a syllogistic model as
premises. Justice Scalia intends his characterization of the initial clause as
prefatory to strip that clause of legal effect. 295 But there is no step in his
argument that explains why status as a prefatory clause should have such
effect. Thus, the structure of his argument is both more informal and more
complex. The formalistic reduction of judicial reasoning to a series of
syllogisms, at least with respect to the Court’s opinion in Heller, is not an
accurate description of the originalist reasoning articulated by the Court.
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court instead introduces claims based upon
tacit assumptions about what readers will accept or endorse. Thus, for
example, when he asserts that one part of the Second Amendment is a
“prefatory clause” in HP2, he offers no argument for that claim. 296 Despite the
fundamental importance of that claim to set up his argument that the reference
to the militia is without legal import, Justice Scalia simply makes the claim
based upon the ambiguous syntactical structure of the text. 297 But the syntax
makes the claim plausible, whether or not true.
The same exercise of outlining the structure of the operative sentences
comprising the judicial decisional texts can be performed with other opinions
of equally impeccable originalist pedigree.298 Non-originalist decisions are
equally resistant to reduction to formal logic. For example, Justice Breyer’s
crisply reasoned dissent in Heller is not an argument expressed in syllogistic
form, and cannot be easily translated into such form. 299 It is important,

295

See id. at 578 (“[A] prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the
operative clause.”).
296
Id. at 577–78.
297
Id.
298
I analyze the reasoning of three recent, important constitutional cases in Beyond
Babel. See LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 6, at 197–220.
299
A similar analysis of the salient propositions of Justice Breyer’s dissent in
Heller is no less easily cast in a syllogistic form:
DP1: The Majority’s opinion is wrong for two independent reasons.
DP2: One reason is set forth by Justice Stevens.
DP3: The rights protected by the Second Amendment relate to militias.
DP4: The second, independent reason is that the rights protected are not
absolute.
DP5: The Amendment permits the government to regulate the interests
that the Amendment serves.
DP6: The Majority can be correct only if it can show that the regulation is
unreasonable or inappropriate.
DP7: The majority cannot satisfy the requirement of DP6.
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moreover, to remark the difference between how an opinion works for the
Court and how a dissenting opinion is written. Because an authoritative
opinion of the Court states the law, it must make that statement more precisely
than a dissenting opinion that serves more as an argument for a contrary result
or approach. A dissenting opinion can be more free-wheeling. 300 Because
dissents are not authoritative law, they do not need to be written as precisely
and transparently as the legal rule that they would endorse if written as an
opinion.
Neither originalist nor non-originalist decisions generally reduce easily to
a syllogism or a series of syllogisms. If it were only non-originalist
constitutional reasoning that did not conform to the formal originalist account,
it might easily be argued that such nonconformity is further evidence that nonoriginalist constitutional reasoning is improper or mistaken. But the
originalists’ formal account of constitutional reasoning fails to fit their own
practice of reasoning, too. It appears inadequate as a description of our
practice of constitutional decisional reasoning. That inadequacy has important
implications.
DP8: Assume with the majority that the Amendment protects firearm
ownership for self-defense.
DP9: The Majority does not assume that the Amendment provides
protection for a specific right to possess handguns with which to shoot
burglars.
DP10: That claim is indefensible.
DP11: Colonial history presents examples of gun regulation.
DP12: That regulation applied in urban areas.
DP13: That regulation restricted the right to defend one’s home.
DP14: The three largest cities at that time restricted the discharge of
firearms at least to some degree.
DP15: Restrictions on the storage of gunpowder would have precluded a
citizen having a firearm that could be immediately discharged without
loading.
DP16: The Majority criticizes my citation of these laws.
DP17: The Majority cannot deny their existence.
DP18: The laws may have had an implied exception for self-defense.
DP19: An argument to that effect can only be made on the basis of the
statutes’ prefaces.
DP20: The majority derides recourse to prefaces as a matter of
interpretation.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 681–87. Despite the crispness with which Justice Breyer
articulates his argument, it is far from syllogistic, even if we begin with DP8, after the
introduction of Justice Breyer’s opinion.
300
It is no coincidence that Justice Scalia’s admirers have been most admiring of
his dissenting opinions. See, e.g., SCALIA DISSENTS: WRITINGS OF THE SUPREME
COURT’S WITTIEST, MOST OUTSPOKEN JUSTICE (Kevin A. Ring ed., 2004).
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Some originalists have attempted to broaden the scope of constitutional
argument by distinguishing constitutional interpretation from constitutional
construction. 301 The former is the proper approach when the constitutional
text speaks to the constitutional question at hand. 302 The latter is proper when
the constitution does not provide a governing provision. 303 The methods
permissible in constitutional construction (which apply to questions for which
there is no determining constitutional text to be interpreted) are broader than
the formal methods applicable in interpretation.304 Constitutional texts are not
easily sorted into the two classes and, moreover, the distinction (to the extent
that it is sensible) is often more a matter of degree than kind. Moreover, many
questions arise when constitutional provisions appear in tension, as with
respect to the provision that the Vice President serves as the President of the
Senate, and the express exception to that rule (only) for trials of the
impeachment of the President. 305 Thus, the New Originalists’ distinction
between construction and interpretation raises important questions for the
originalist project that the new originalists do not fully acknowledge. 306
The formality of the originalist model plays an important part in that
theory. Formality supports the certainty and focus that originalism seeks. 307
The model of adjudication confirms originalism’s narrow focus on sources and
methods. Originalism, having circumscribed the sources of law by its
exclusive focus on the original meaning of the provisions, seeks also to
preclude a consideration of the pragmatics of the application of the
understanding for the case at hand, or a consideration of whether and how that
301

WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 118, at 5–9.
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id. at 3–9 (emphasizing the political choices that must be made in construction);
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7–13.
305
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
306
The new originalists acknowledge these questions tacitly when they articulate
a somewhat different mission for their theory. See, e.g., Sachs, Legal Change, supra
note 70.
307
Thus, for example, Justice Scalia wrote an essay emphasizing the importance
of the certainty and impartiality of rules of law rather than discretionary and ad hoc
justice. See Scalia, Rules, supra note 248. Justice Scalia’s focus upon, and preference
for, legal rules, is a complementary element of his formalistic originalist jurisprudence.
Both aspire to and purport to characterize constitutional argument as a highly
structured practice that doe not require the diverse sources of constitutional authority
and more open-ended kinds of argument that originalism’s critics endorse. Martha
Nussbaum has emphasized the formalism in contemporary conservative constitutional
jurisprudence. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities:
“Perception” against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2007) (arguing that
recent constitutional formalism in the Court has produced doctrinal developments that
have undermined important substantive constitutional rights and resulted in injustice).
302
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original understanding is reconciled or harmonized with precedent. Thus, the
model of syllogistic reasoning provides the second part of originalism’s
comprehensive theory of constitutional interpretation. Originalists who
distinguish constitutional construction from interpretation must (and do) offer
an account for when construction is permitted. 308 When they offer this
account, however, they compromise the originalist agenda of restricting
judicial discretion and the role of judgment.
B. The Critics’ Alternative to the Formal Account of Legal Reasoning
There are three principal objections to the originalists’ theoretical account
of legal reasoning: that syllogism fails to capture the complexity of
constitutional arguments; that constitutional interpretation is primarily a
matter of harmonizing conflicting or inconsistent interpretations; and that
constitutional reasoning is not theoretical reasoning, but practical reasoning.
Critics have largely emphasized only two of the objections.
Critics of originalism adopt a different, less formal account of
constitutional reasoning, but they often do so tacitly rather than expressly. For
example, critics argue that the methods of constitutional interpretation cannot
be reduced to a syllogistic form in which only the express provisions of the
constitutional text are taken as major premises. They argue that legal
reasoning is much more fluid, much more balancing, and more judgmental
than the process described by originalism’s structured, syllogistic account. 309
The model of the syllogism fails to capture the richness and complexity of
constitutional argument, either in theory or in practice. 310
Critics point to originalist argument as disproving such an account.
Constitutional disputes about the scope of the habeas corpus writ with respect
to detainees in Guantánamo, or the scope of the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment, appear to implicate precedential issues, ethical issues, prudential
issues and even, perhaps, issues relating to institutional competences within
the federal government. These disputes would not appear to be easily reduced
to questions about the validity of constitutional syllogisms. 311
308

See generally WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note

118.
309

See SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 240, at 13–34.
See TRIBE, INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 9 (arguing that
constitutional interpretation and decision proceeds in the context of, and in reliance
upon “a vast and deep—and crucially, invisible—ocean of ideas, propositions,
recovered memories, and imagined experiences”); see also PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra
note 9, at 169–72; SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 240.
311
In assessing this debate, we should acknowledge the limited descriptive claim
made by originalism. Originalism acknowledges that current constitutional practice is
full of error. See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 95–100 (criticizing
310
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The brief reconstruction of the argument in Heller above supports this
claim. The Heller argument is at once richer and less formal than a syllogistic
account might suggest. That departure cannot be explained on the basis that
the opinion is designed to persuade the reader of its validity and therefore its
rhetorical techniques reflect that advocacy. The argument simply cannot be fit
within the procrustean syllogistic model. For example, many of the apparent
premises of the argument are stated without argument or other derivation. 312
The second argument against the syllogistic reduction proffered in
originalism is that much of the task of constitutional interpretation is one of
harmonizing conflicting or inconsistent interpretations or arguments. 313 The
task is not so much one of finding an interpretation of the Constitution but of
settling on only one. The competing interpretations or potential decisions are
not generally distinguishable on the basis of the validity of their embedded
logical inferences, and the nature of their practical reasoning is often closer to
an inductive model than to deduction. Syllogisms are not very good at
providing a solution to those kinds of problems of practical reasoning. 314 By
hypothesis, each of the competing interpretations or proposed decisions is
supported by reason and argument. The problem is not constructing a
syllogism, but of weighing the arguments, evidence, and inferences implicated
by the competing interpretations and decisions. Those implications and
inferences are not confined to the syllogisms that may be derived from an
interpretation.
The third argument begins by remarking that constitutional reasoning is a
form of practical reasoning, not theoretical reasoning. 315 Important accounts
of practical reasoning recognize that such reasoning cannot be reduced to, or

Griswold); 111–16 (criticizing Roe v. Wade); 116–23 (criticizing the dissent in
Bowers v. Hardwick); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 41–42; 140
(criticizing Planned Parenthood v. Casey on the basis that the right to an abortion is
not protected by the Constitution, but acknowledging the authoritative force of
precedent). To the extent originalism offers prescription, departure from the
description of existing practice is not necessarily troubling. Still, there is a sense in
which constitutional disputes do not appear to be easily assimilated to disputes about
major or minor premises in a syllogism.
312
The propositions stated in notes 287 and 288 are generally stated without
argument.
313
Bobbitt’s account is an example of a theory that emphasizes the indeterminacy
of constitutional argument. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 88, at xi.
314
See, e.g., POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 53–54 (describing the limitations
of logic in substantive legal reasoning).
315
See generally J. DAVID VELLEMAN, THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL REASON
(1989); GILBERT HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW: PRINCIPLES OF REASONING 1 (1986)
[hereinafter HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW]; TOULMIN, ARGUMENT, supra note 33.
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assimilated to, deductive argument. 316 Practical reasoning looks more like the
kind of reasoning that Stephen Toulmin has described. 317 Toulmin argues that
our reasoning is richer and more complex than classical logical descriptions
suggest. 318 He acknowledges that the classical paradigm of logical reasoning
is the syllogism. 319 But he doesn’t think that the syllogism adequately captures
much of our practical reasoning. 320 In Toulmin’s reconstruction of our
reasoning, instead of a major premise, minor premise, and conclusion, we have
claims, data, warrants, backing, exceptions, and qualifiers. 321 The relationship
of these elements of argument is more complex and intricate than mere
syllogisms easily capture. Indeed, Toulmin highlights the ambiguity of
common syllogisms. 322 According to Toulmin, syllogisms of first order logic,
stripped of a modal vocabulary, cannot do the work that we need them to do. 323
The formal model for legal reasoning adopted by originalism is a corollary
to the claims of reliance on the unique, knowable original understanding of the
Constitution. 324 By claiming that the legal reasoning necessary for
constitutional decision-making is syllogistic, wide swathes of informal,
practical styles of reasoning are excluded from the account.325 Such a formal
model reinforces the claims of originalism that constitutional disputes are
semantic disputes. If legal reasoning (along with many other forms of practical
reasoning) is the more complex, open-ended practice that Toulmin describes,
the originalist project of rendering a formal account of the Constitution and
constitutional reasoning appears less plausible, if not wholly inadequate. 326
316
See, e.g., HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW, supra note 315, at 1 (describing how, as
a matter of practical reasoning, we come to change our views, giving the seemingly
simple example of changing one’s mind about what to have for breakfast).
317
TOULMIN, ARGUMENT, supra note 33, at vii (making a philosophical claim that
argument in practical reasoning is irreducible to “a rigidly demonstrative deduction of
the kind to be found in Euclidean geometry.”).
318
Id. at 89 (explaining the nature of legal arguments).
319
Id. (discussing the Aristotelian account of reasoning).
320
Id. at 89–100; see also PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 9, at 169–72 (applying
Toulmin’s description to legal argument).
321
TOULMIN, ARGUMENT, supra note 33, at 89–100.
322
Id. at 100–05. Toulmin offers the example of the proposition “All A’s are B’s.”
That proposition may be true for a variety of reasons—by definition, by statute, by
empirical investigation, or as a moral value statement. The short form statement
obscures the significance and meaning of the claim.
323
Id. at 89. Toulmin takes the complexity of legal argument and proof as his
model by which to amplify the customary syllogistic rendition of practical argument.
324
See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 45.
325
The analogical reasoning emphasized by Sunstein would appear to be excluded,
for example. See SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 240, at 62–83.
326
The implications of Toulmin’s account of reasoning are reinforced by Bobbitt’s
claim that there is no metric or method that can be applied to resolve the relative claims
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In relevant part, the text of the First Amendment simply prohibits
Congress from making any law abridging the freedom of the press. 327 The
originalists have split in their analysis of this provision. Some have followed
traditional constitutional doctrine 328 in interpreting and applying the First
Amendment to preclude similar legislation with respect to broadcast media. 329
How do they explain the disregard for the semantic meaning of the text and its
original understanding and the expectations with respect thereto? Justice
Scalia says that the language is a synecdoche. 330 But he never explains why
that language is a synecdoche, or even why the concept of reading a term in a
constitutional provision as a synecdoche is permissible. Such a reading reveals
the tacit invocation of informal techniques that employ the principles of
implicature in constitutional decision and interpretation. But that is subtler
and more complex than the formal account articulated suggests is possible.
Others hew more closely to the language of the Amendment, interpreting the
concept of speech more narrowly. 331 They confine the protection of the
amendment to political speech. 332 Even Robert Bork extends the protection of
the First Amendment to novel forms of communication, 333 employing
interpretative techniques that expressly go beyond history and text. 334
Justice Scalia’s account of the First Amendment’s reference to “speech”
as a synecdoche never explains how that conclusion is to be supported by
formal argument. 335 Speech, after all, often meant speech, even in the
eighteenth century. 336 Indeed, reading speech as a synecdoche is to adopt a
non-canonical interpretation of that term. The arguments that may be offered
of the six modes of constitutional argument. Each can produce its own sets of
syllogism, but no further formal argument can enable us to systematically determine
which mode of argument ought to be controlling in a particular case. See generally
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 88, at xi.
327
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
328
See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
656–67 (1969) (assuming that the First Amendment principles apply to broadcast
media despite not being expressly mentioned and exploring the differences in the way
in which the protections of the First Amendment ought to apply); ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
329
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 37–38.
330
Id. at 38 (“[S]peech and press, the two most common forms of communication,
stand as a sort of synecdoche for the whole.”). It is unclear what Justice Scalia means
by his equivocation that it is a “sort of” synecdoche.
331
Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 3, at 21 (“Any such reading [of speech to
mean any form of expression] is, of course, impossible.”).
332
Id. at 21–23.
333
Id.
334
Id. at 22.
335
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 38.
336
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Samuel Johnson ed., 3d ed. 1762).
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for such a reading are not easily cast as syllogisms with major and minor
premises.
C. Conclusion
Originalism’s emphases on semantic content and the formal description of
legal reasoning are complementary. The syllogistic account works with
arguments from and about meanings. If originalism incorporated prudential
arguments, such practical reasoning would not naturally be cast into syllogistic
form. Instead, informal inductive arguments, modal arguments, and other
more complex inferential strategies, would likely be needed. 337 So the
exclusive focus on meanings makes the formal account of legal argument and
reasoning more plausible. Similarly, the formal account for legal reasoning
helps to explain how judges may move from abstract statements about the text
to decisions in particular cases. Moreover, by reducing legal arguments to
such formal logical models, originalism reinforces the claim to be neutral and
non-discretionary. 338
The formality of Judge Bork and Justice Scalia’s account of legal
reasoning is the second element of their theory of law. 339 On their account,
law generally, and constitutional law in particular, is best understood as a
series of rules that can serve as the major premise in syllogisms of legal
reasoning. 340 The functional importance of those rules, like originalism itself,

337

For example, in a prudential argument in favor of restricting some of the historic
constitutional rights of criminal suspects in the modern world of global, stateless
terrorists with access to weapons of mass destruction, a significant part of the argument
must address the premise of threat. Such an advocate needs a Brandeis brief on
terrorism. This line of argument is empirical, not formal. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER,
NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006)
(defending the constitutional permissibility of certain novel forms of surveillance
while asserting the continuing need for constitutional limits on more intrusive forms
of governmental intervention in our personal and social lives).
338
The claim to neutrality and the project of cabining discretion has been central
to originalism from the get go. See Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 70; BORK,
TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 140–41 (defending originalism as providing a metric by
which to assess constitutional decisions and thereby to restrain judicial discretion).
339
See generally, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 253–54, 262
(characterizing proper constitutional argument as a matter of constructing syllogisms
with the mayor premises drawn from the original meaning of the constitutional text);
Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 3; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 45
(characterizing the task of constitutional adjudication as simply that of applying the
original meaning of the constitutional text to the case at bar).
340
Scalia, Rules, supra note 248.
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is to cabin the subjective preferences of judges. 341 When an appellate judge
adopts a legal rule, she not only binds lower courts, she binds herself. 342 Thus,
for Justice Scalia, legal rules coupled with stare decisis binds the judicial
Odysseus to the mast, preventing escape to the siren calls confronting her. Is
this a plausible account, empirically, doctrinally, psychologically, or
philosophically?
I doubt it very much. 343 First, legal history includes few accounts of
judicial odysseys in which foresighted judges have been pinned by prior legal
rules to the mast of consistent principle. 344 Justice Scalia does not cite any
examples in his Chicago essay. 345 His account of the force of precedent seems
implausible because judges generally recognize the primacy of judgment in
their obligation to decide cases. 346 It is unclear how the obligation to provide
the best judgment would permit a prior judgment, now viewed as incorrect, to
trump. 347
Second, as a matter of the nature of rules and rule-following, the kind of
constraint Justice Scalia is invoking doesn’t exist. 348 Justice Scalia has
confused the space of reasons with the space of causes. 349 Legal rules,
howsoever abstract and broad of application, will not bind the appellate judge

341

Id. at 1176 (describing the criticism of vague laws as undemocratic because
they shift decision making from the democratically-elected representatives of the
people to judges or executive branch administrators); see also BORK, TEMPTING, supra
note 7, at 141 (“[A]ny theory [of constitutional decision] worthy of consideration must
both state an acceptable range of judicial results and, in doing that, confine the judge’s
power over us.”).
342
Scalia, Rules, supra note 248, at 1176–77.
343
See FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013); Baude,
Originalism as a Constraint, supra note 1.
344
Posner makes a very similar point in his discussion of the force of legal
precedent in the courts. See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 87–100; see also
CROSS, supra note 343; Baude, Originalism as a Constraint, supra note 1.
345
See generally Scalia, Rules, supra note 248.
346
See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 88, at 166–67 (describing an
exchange between Judge Learned Hand and Judge Henry Friendly).
347
For an account of changing judgments in practical reasoning, see HARMAN,
CHANGE IN VIEW, supra note 315. For a more general approach to practical reasoning,
see J. DAVID VELLEMAN, THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL REASON (1989).
348
See WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, § 172. It
may feel that way, as Achilles suggested to the hare, but that is another matter. See
Lewis Carroll, What the Tortoise Said to Achilles, 4 MIND 278, 279 (1895).
349
Cf. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 251 (arguing that a non-originalist theory
of the Constitution is impossible much like a perpetual motion machine is impossible
under the laws of physics).
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who formulated the rule in the manner Justice Scalia wants and asserts. With
respect to the lower court judges, the effect may be somewhat different.350
Third, as a doctrinal matter, it does not appear that in the evolution of
constitutional doctrine that rules have grasped the Court by the throat in a
subsequent case and made it decide the case differently than it otherwise would
have done. 351 Proving that negative persuasively is not an easy task, of course.
But in the absence of examples adduced by the proponents of the position that
constitutional doctrine has such force, skepticism would appear justified. The
practice of the Court to revisit precedent as necessary casts substantial doubt
upon the claim of constraint. The modal, pluralist description of constitutional
argument defended here offers an alternative account of decision that explains
why decision is underdetermined rather than indeterminate but rejects the
claim that the linguistic meaning of constitutional texts has constrained the
Court’s decision of constitutional controversies.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A BETTER ACCOUNT OF INTERPRETATION
AND OF REASONING
There are three principal implications of a richer account of interpretation
and constitutional reasoning with respect to the debate over originalism. The
first implication arises from the originalist commitment, shared with many of
its critics, that the central task of constitutional decision is interpretation. 352
350
Lower courts are bound by the decisions of their superior appellate courts. Does
this mean that their commitment to following precedent stands as a counterexample to
Lewis Carroll’s fable? Well, no. The social practice of federal court adjudication and
stare decisis insure that most lower courts will try very hard most of the time to follow
their controlling precedent. Moreover, their opinions will construct a narrative of
harmony and compliance. They will do so even when the governing precedents are
muddy or confused. Lower courts will do so for a variety of reasons. At the margins,
they are constrained, in theory, by the threat of impeachment, but that is a loose and
unimportant constraint on doctrinal error. More realistically, in the realm in which
decisions are made, they do so because the professional and legal community of which
they are respected members values such compliance and disfavors judges whose
decisions must be reversed. None of this account is novel or surprising, of course.
But there is no sense in which such constraints on lower courts find themselves gripped
by logic or precedent in a manner that compels an outcome in a manner inconsistent
with the tortoise’s experience with Achilles. See Carroll, supra note 348, at 279 (best
read for the implicit lesson that not all inferences may be justified by express
principles, as Brandom emphasizes).
351
See generally id.; CROSS, supra note 343. But see Baude, Originalism as a
Constraint, supra note 1.
352
See generally TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 6–30. It is not clear
that Tribe’s assertion of the primacy of interpretation is consistent with his later
views. See generally TRIBE, INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 5–8.
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The premise that the task of decision is a matter of interpretation has led, for
example, to the controversy over the problem of the level of generality. 353
Tribe and Dorf argue that constitutional provisions are of indeterminate
generality, and that the interpretive problems posed by that indeterminacy
preclude an exclusive originalism. 354 Thus, according to them, the existence
of the problem of generality precludes the reliance on original meanings that
originalism demands. The critics are wrong here.
Tribe’s examples make a strong case that constitutional provisions do have
different levels of generality. That demonstration sets up the need to determine
the level of generality at which a provision is to be interpreted and applied.
Tribe argues that the text alone cannot, as a linguistic matter, specify the level
of generality without creating an infinite regress. 355
Having purportedly established the problem of generality, Tribe explains
how a judge may determine the level of generality of a constitutional
provision. 356 The judge’s task incorporates both textual interpretation, 357 and
political and moral value choices. 358 Tribe is at pains to note that not all
constitutional provisions state or implicate broad moral principles. 359 Within
that broad framework for interpretation and adjudication, Tribe believes it is
impossible to define a more precise description of, or decision theory for,
judging. 360 Instead, Tribe’s approach, as reflected in his work, American
Constitutional Law, is much more concrete and historical. 361 His first strategy
is to describe a variety of constitutional provisions and to invite the reader to
acknowledge that the provisions do not have a transparent statement of their
level of generality. 362

353

See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 73.
Id. at 73–74, 80.
355
Id.
356
Id. at 73.
357
Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 77.
358
TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 78–80 (citing Paul Brest and
concluding that even after semantic and linguistic analysis is done, that “[t]he valueladen choice of a level of generality remains.”).
359
Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 68, 72, 80.
360
Id. at 68–69 (emphasizing the complex and not wholly consistent sources and
strands of the constitutional text and rejecting interpretations that offer a single,
unifying interpretation of that text).
361
See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed.
1988).
362
See generally id. (describing seven theoretical models of the Constitution that
tacitly informed the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence over time, not as competing
modes of constitutional argument as in Bobbitt’s modal account); TRIBE & DORF,
READING, supra note 9, at 73–80.
354
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Originalists deny the existence of a problem of generality. 363 They argue
that the text and the context of the Constitution usually make clear the level of
generality at which a constitutional provision speaks. 364 In the face of
uncertainty, the alternatives are to disregard the unclear provision or to
construe it at the most specific, least general level. 365 It is not easy to restate
the debate on this issue in a manner that permits a more productive dialogue.
It may be helpful, however, to consider the respective positions in the context
of specific examples.
The First Amendment provides in relevant part that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press . . . .” 366 At what
level of generality does that prohibition operate? That question was implicitly
before the Court in Citizens United. 367 The issue of generality presented itself
in at least three dimensions in Citizens United: the scope of the definition of
speech, the limits of a protected right, and the scope of speakers protected. 368
Justice Scalia concurred in the opinion of the court holding that the First
Amendment protects the right of corporations to fund political film
distribution costs. 369 In so holding, Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens debated
these questions by reference to the original understanding of the First
Amendment. 370 Justice Scalia argued that the original understanding was that
all persons are protected. 371 Therefore, he read the level of generality as
absolute, even in the face of the dissent’s objection that corporations cannot
speak, 372 an argument Justice Scalia dismissed as “sophistry” without defense
363
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 135 (arguing that the context of
a provision determines its meaning and, accordingly, its scope or generality); BORK,
TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 149–50.
364
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 135; BORK, TEMPTING, supra
note 7, at 149–50.
365
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 166; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
127–28, n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (“One would think that Justice Brennan would
appreciate the value of consulting the most specific tradition available . . . .”). Justice
Scalia never explains or defends his claim that in constitutional decision a judge should
look for the most particular constitutional interpretation or construction, or his ad
hominem claim that Justice Brennan should endorse such an approach. On its face,
such an approach may appear narrow and mechanical, absent any indication that the
Constitution ought to be read that way. Moreover, the critics are right that a text cannot
be self-interpreting.
366
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
367
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
368
Id.
369
See id. at 385–93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
370
See id. at 391–92 (Scalia, J., concurring), 425–29 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
371
Id. at 385, 385–86 (Scalia, J., concurring).
372
Id. at 428 n.55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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or amplification. 373 Justice Scalia apparently thought the argument sophistical
because the law attributes personality to corporations in a variety of contexts
in order to hold them legally responsible for the acts of their agents and to
regulate their activity, through their agents, more generally. 374 But an
argument for personality in the contexts of liability and regulation hardly is
dispositive for a corresponding concept in the case of First Amendment rights.
Nor do fundamental considerations of fairness, arguing that burdens and
obligations ought to be paired with rights, provide a plausible argument,
because questions of fairness for juridical entities are very different (if
meaningful at all) compared to the corresponding questions for natural
persons. We are perhaps betrayed by our language into thinking the
correspondence is closer than it actually is. 375
The argument with respect to the generality of the prohibition on
abridgement was subtler. The Court moved quickly past the question of what
qualifies as speech, vaguely referring to a “speech process” and relying on the
established doctrine reading protected speech broadly. 376 Justice Scalia reads
the term “speech” as a synecdoche for the implicit expansive communicative
concept, which he found to include financing film distribution costs. 377 It is
difficult to reconcile the holding in this case, or the dissent, with the
proposition that the generality of this constitutional provision can be extracted
from the semantic meaning of its terms. If the generality of the provision and
its associated linguistic and constitutional legal content is not simply a matter
of the semantic meaning of its terms, what are the sources of such content?

373

Id. at 392 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia’s claim that the argument
that corporations cannot speak is sophistry likely is based upon two tacit premises.
First, corporations can do nothing on their own; they must always act through agents,
generally human, but potentially other agents, too (one imagines a corporation offering
drug interdiction services that employs specially trained beagles). Second, we
nevertheless generally employ the legal fiction of regulating corporations, both civilly
and criminally. Selectively ignoring our array of fictions speaking to corporations
only in the context of constitutional rights without explanation or argument does
indeed appear specious. That conclusion does not resolve the question whether the
First Amendment’s protections extend to corporations.
374
Id. at 392–93 (emphasizing that there is no disagreement that the production of
the film was a form of speech).
375
See WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, § 350
(asking what it would mean for it to be 5 o’clock somewhere on the surface of the
sun).
376
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336–37.
377
Id. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasizing that speech has always been
read broadly, not literally in interpreting the protection of the First Amendment); see
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 37–38 (arguing that “speech” and “press”
are used like synecdoche in the First Amendment).
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How do the originalists and their critics reconcile such sources with their
accounts of constitutional reasoning?
One solution to this puzzle is to recognize that this dispute over the
purported problem of generality is, at best, confused. If we discard the premise
that the application of a rule first requires an interpretation of the rule, then it
seems unlikely that there is a problem of generality. The rule grasped and
applied simply has a level of generality. That is what the rule is, and how it is
applied. 378 We do not need to have a question of interpretation independent of
the question of how the rule is to be applied. 379 One might try to rehabilitate
Tribe’s claims about the problem of generality as a badly stated claim about
the uncertainty as to how a rule is to be applied. 380 That is, Tribe’s claim that
the text of a rule cannot tell us how to interpret the rule or, more importantly,
to apply the rule, is more plausible.
But Tribe’s claim misses the point that we can understand and follow an
array of rules without ever needing something else with which to interpret such
rules. Tribe’s claim could be recast as an assertion that the choice of how to
apply a rule requires a value choice or judgment. The objection to such a claim
is that it appears reductive. It appears to derive the constitutional ought or rule
from a moral or other sphere of value. 381 The choices that inform
constitutional decision are constitutional choices and are made within the
context of our constitutional practice. Those constitutional choices cannot be
reduced to political or to moral choices, but that is not to assert that those
choices are wholly independent of those political and moral choices and
values. Justice Scalia contrasts the extremes of textual literalism and
nihilism, 382 and other originalists also appear to assume that the alternative to

378

See generally WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79,
§§ 83–240, and text at supra notes 220–238. Robert Brandom has also rejected of the
problem of infinite regress. Brandom, Legal Concept Determination, supra note 17,
at 21–22 (expressly invoking Lewis Carroll’s logic fable of Achilles and the Tortoise
to deny that a legal rule needs an interpretation before it can be applied). See generally
LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31, at 320–22.
379
See generally WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79,
§§ 83–240, and text at supra notes 220–238.
380
This rehabilitation appears difficult as a textual matter because one of Tribe’s
central, repeated objections to originalism’s claim to neutrality is that value judgments
must be made in constitutional decision. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES (1985); see also TRIBE, INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 5–8
(arguing that we cannot read and apply the Constitution without also understanding an
Unwritten Constitution that incorporates the unspoken and unwritten foundations
underlying and tacitly incorporated in the Constitution).
381
I am unclear whether Tribe intends such a reduction, but I am inclined to believe
so. Exploring that question would take us too far afield here.
382
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 24.
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principled originalist decision is unfettered judicial discretion.383 Both
dichotomies are forced and misleading. Constitutional decision can be
constrained and subject to limitations of practice without being determinate or
reducible to an algorithm.
If we reject the premise that constitutional decision must begin with an
interpretation of the Constitution, the problem of generality does not arise. The
problem of generality is a problem of interpretations, not a problem of
applying rules themselves. The knowledge of the rule consists in the
knowledge of how to apply it. There is no problem of generality in the rule of
addition. There is no reason to accept the epistemological premise that one
cannot know how to follow or apply a rule unless and until one has a
controlling interpretation of the rule. 384 Tribe’s criticism of originalism on this
ground is unpersuasive. 385 Here the originalists have the better stance, but not
for the reasons they advance. It is not that the text is self-interpreting, but that
constitutional decision may proceed without a logically prior interpretation of
the constitutional text. But the benefits from rejecting the claim that
interpretation is logically prior to application of constitutional rules goes
beyond dissolving the paradox of the level of generality.
The second implication of a better account of adjudication that does not
make interpretation the prior and primary element in constitutional decision is
more fundamental. If interpretation is not prior to decision, then an account of
constitutional adjudication must explain constitutional decision without
necessarily beginning with interpretation. This article has explained why
describing judicial decision as beginning with interpretation is an unpersuasive
account of constitutional rules and rule following. In addition to the generality
puzzle described above, beginning with interpretation mistakenly
overemphasizes the constitutional text and the semantic and linguistic
dimensions of that text and our constitutional law. The practice of
constitutional law is not entirely a linguistic practice. That is in substantial
part because the performative dimension of legal texts—the Constitution and
383
See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 254–57 (arguing that the absence
of a moral consensus precludes a legitimate appeal to moral principles in law).
384
See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31, at 280 n.79. An analogy
may be found in the rules of grammar; many are able to speak grammatically without
being able to state or interpret the applicable grammatical rule that makes a particular
utterance grammatical. It is not a perfect analogy because the practice of constitutional
law requires the authoritative participants not just to decide cases but also to make and
respond to arguments. But while some of those arguments are grounded on
interpretations and interpretative claims, not all are—or need to be. See MOLIÈRE, LE
BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME Act II, scene iv (F. M. Warren ed., 1899) (1670).
385
See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 73–80; LeDuc, Ontological
Foundations, supra note 31, at 320–22; Brandom, Legal Concept Determination,
supra note 17, at 19–20.
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judicial decisions—is embedded in the constitutional practice of deciding
constitutional controversies. Those practices are not plausibly reduced to
entirely linguistic practices. The best alternative to the interpretative model of
the debate is the modal, pluralist account articulated by Bobbitt and Patterson
and, more recently, by Brandom 386 and me. 387 That account dispenses with a
reductive formalistic, linguistic description of practical reasoning in
constitutional decisions. This article has explained in more depth why the
description of constitutional interpretation assumed or defended by both
originalists and their critics and the role accorded interpretation in
constitutional decision is inadequate. Briefly, there is a better alternative
description. The limitations of the interpretative model and the existence of a
richer, more accurate alternative thus offers another powerful argument for a
non-interpretative theory of constitutional decision.
The third important implication of a richer description of our practice
arises with respect to our account of constitutional reasoning. If interpretation
is not a condition precedent to constitutional decision, then we are positioned
to describe constitutional decision in non-interpretive terms. Our account of
constitutional argument and decision can incorporate the modes of
constitutional argument that are manifestly non-interpretive like prudential,
structural, and doctrinal, the last of which, to the extent it is interpretive, is not
interpretive with respect to the constitutional text alone. We can capture the
social practice of constitutional argument and decision in the various forms
that it takes. For example, at least since the introduction of the Brandeis brief,
prudential arguments are made in constitutional cases. 388 The consequences
of decisions can be debated and the description of those consequences that
prevails—often, of course in the face of uncertainty—can be taken into
account in the decision of the case.
Originalism and its critics rely upon very different accounts of
constitutional reasoning. The formal originalist account of constitutional
reasoning is manifestly unsatisfactory as a description of our practice of
constitutional reasoning as captured by the Court’s opinions. The nonoriginalist account appears on the right track when it asserts that constitutional

386

Brandom, Legal Concept Determination, supra note 17, at 19–20 (offering a
Hegelian description of judicial decision that emphasizes the reciprocal roles of
authority and responsibility for judges).
387
LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational
Challenge, supra note 194.
388
See generally MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 161 (2009)
(discussing Justice Brandeis’ development of a revolutionary form of legal brief that
relied on scientific data and social science research rather than on traditional
constitutional arguments and legal citations alone).
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reasoning is more informal and flexible than the originalist account. 389 When
we study the way that the Court (and dissenting Justices) articulate their
arguments, we see that it is not cast in syllogistic form. 390 The arguments made
cannot be reduced to that form and important elements of the opinions often
are not cast as arguments at all.
Those models of constitutional reasoning are largely tacitly assumed
rather than defended. 391 Originalism generally assumes a highly formal,
syllogistic model. 392 The model is one of major and minor premises, linked
by the principles of deductive inference. 393 It is not clear that inductive
reasoning is a significant part of this account.394 For example, inductive
arguments with respect to the consequences of potential interpretations or
decisions would generally not be proper. 395 That prohibition on inductive
argument, which requires an ordered set of particular consequences which
could be enumerated as the basis for an argument as to the proper interpretation
or application of a constitutional provision. Those particulars in the present
day, of course, likely could not have been understood, anticipated, or intended
389
See, e.g., Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 83–87; TRIBE & DORF,
READING, supra note 9, at 114–17.
390
While it might be argued that the argument incorporates implicit, suppressed
premises, and with the introduction of these premises the argument could be recast as
a series of syllogisms, it is not clear that such a redescription is compelling. Some of
the sentences in the opinions do not appear to figure into an argument at all, yet they
do not appear to be extraneous asides. See generally BRANDOM, INFERENTIALISM,
supra note 137, at 82–92 (rejecting a description of practical reasoning as syllogistic
through such an imputation of suppressed premises).
391
See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 145 (characterizing the
Constitution as articulating abstract principles in its provisions, the original
understanding of which must first be understood and then applied to the case at hand);
Easterbrook, Alternatives, supra note 47 ; POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 53–86
(rejecting the model of the logical syllogism for legal reasoning and arguing that logic
can play only a critical, constraining role in legal reasoning, helping to avoid error but
not to reach correct substantive results); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 261–65
(suggesting that constitutional reasoning may be cast in the formal logic of syllogism).
392
See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 262 (describing constitutional decision
as requiring interpretation to determine the applicable constitutional rule and
syllogistic reasoning to apply that rule to the case at bar).
393
Id.
394
Inductive reasoning may be employed in originalism to define terms used in a
constitutional provision, for example. Examples of instances qualifying under a
definition might thus help determine whether the relevant term encompassed the object
or activity presented in the case at bar. But even in that instance, once the definition
had been derived, the constitutional argument would appear susceptible of being cast
in a deductive mode.
395
Such arguments would appear impermissible both as inductive arguments and
because they focus upon the consequences of alternative interpretations or decisions.
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(or unintended) by the relevant original actors.396 Even in the case of
particulars that may have been known to the relevant original actors, however,
originalism would account for those facts only in a mediated manner as
evidence for the meaning or understanding of the meaning of the relevant
provision. 397 Thus, the formality of the syllogistic reasoning would be
preserved. Those originalists who do not go as far as Bork in asserting that
constitutional reasoning is syllogistic nevertheless generally endorse formal
accounts, too. 398
Critics have challenged that account, both as a description of how courts
reason, and as a prescriptive account of the task of adjudication. With respect
to the account of legal reasoning about the Constitution, Aristotelian
syllogisms play far less of a role than originalists tacitly assert. Legal
reasoning cannot be easily so reduced to that logical form. Sophisticated
accounts of the complexity of reasoning, from Stephen Toulmin to modern
modal logicians, offer a theoretical account of our reasoning that supports the
empirical evidence we find for more complex patterns in constitutional
opinions and arguments. 399 When we turn to that theory both for its descriptive
force and as a theoretical, normative account of how our constitutional
reasoning should proceed, the formalist foundations of originalism do not
survive. Without those foundations, some of the manifest appeal of
originalism’s crystalline clarity dissolves; when we return to Wittgenstein’s
“rough ground”, 400 we may find that we need a richer theory of constitutional
adjudication and interpretation than originalism, or generally its critics, offer.

396

To the extent such particular consequences could have arisen in the relevant
past, such instances could support an inductive argument for the original
understandings or intentions.
397
Thus, for example, when the Court considers arguments about the scope of the
President’s authority under the Recess Appointments Clause, it does not consider
arguments from pure political philosophy. Instead, it refracts those arguments thru the
lens of our practice of structural arguments about the particular democratic republican
state that the Congress has created. See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2568
(2014) (arguing in favor of the conclusion that the Clause ought to apply to preexisting vacancies so that the work of the government might proceed). See generally
LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 6, at 214–18.
398
See, e.g., Scalia, Rules, supra note 248.
399
See, e.g., BRANDOM, INFERENTIALISM, supra note 137, at 82–92 (describing
practical reasoning); DAVID K. LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS (1973) (describing the
nature of counterfactual conditionals); TOULMIN, ARGUMENT, supra note 33.
400
See WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, § 107
(suggesting that our philosophical analysis of language ought not to elide the apparent
anomalies and complexities of ordinary language and use).
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Such an account of constitutional reasoning exists. But it must begin, as
Hart did, with a description of our legal practices. 401 Theory must begin with
description. There is no authoritative, normative stance that stands both within
our practice of constitutional argument and decision, as well as outside and
above that practice. That claim is neither obvious nor generally accepted, of
course. I have previously offered my own rendition of the arguments for the
claim and I will not reiterate them here. 402
The failure to articulate the foundations that originalism assumes in
characterizing constitutional argument has also resulted in the protagonists in
the debate often talking past each other. Originalism is committed to a formal
account of constitutional argument, while its critics would include other forms
of argument, too. Without common ground on the methodological question as
to the nature of permissible constitutional argument, it is hardly surprising that
there is no agreement on the conclusions that may be drawn from such
arguments. Robert Bork was perhaps the originalist who has been clearest on
this point, denying legitimacy to the more free-form opinions and decisions of
the Warren Court on the grounds that their reasoning was improper. 403 But
because many of originalism’s critics do not share originalism’s model of
interpretation and practical reason, there is little room for agreement. It is not
clear that agreement on the methodological question would lead to an
agreement on the substantive disagreements, but the resulting debate would be
more transparent. Each side would need to begin by recognizing that they
must defend their respective accounts of constitutional reasoning and
argument on descriptive and prescriptive grounds. We need an adequate
descriptive account because the practice of constitutional argument and
decision is groundless; there is no Archimedean stance from which to radically
reform that practice. Therefore, any adequate account of the practice must
begin with an adequate description.
The potential to rehabilitate the debate over originalism is not promising.
The debate is derivative of more fundamental disagreements about the nature
of law and practical reasoning. Resolution of the debate over originalism, on
the terms on which it has been conducted, would appear hostage to those more
fundamental controversies. The originalists adopt a simplistic model of
practical reasoning that they assert or assume is applicable in the reasoning of
401

HART, CONCEPT, supra note 138, at 88–91 (insisting on the existence of an
internal point of view toward legal obligations as an element of a description of our
social behavior).
402
See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 194; LeDuc,
Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6; see also BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 3–8
(describing a groundbreaking pluralist modal account of constitutional argument and
decision); PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 9, at 151–79 (describing and defending
what he terms “post modern jurisprudence”).
403
See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 95–100 (criticizing Griswold).
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constitutional judicial decision. Their critics reject that model. The
originalists’ model buttresses their claims that originalism’s methods are the
only legitimate methods, but originalism’s modes or arguments could be
salvaged and deployed in the context of particular controversies without the
claims it makes about constitutional reasoning. 404 Those claims about
constitutional reasoning are employed in defense of originalism’s claim to
privilege the methods of interpretation based upon the original understandings,
expectations, and intentions. But those modes of argument—albeit not as
privileged modes—are legitimate simply because they are an accepted part of
our practice of constitutional argument. 405 They do not need any further
foundation. Accordingly, the rejection by originalism’s critics of the
originalist account of constitutional reasoning also does not discredit the
modes of originalist argument, or privilege the kinds of argument that
originalism’s critics make—and generally seek to privilege in turn.
Resolving the debate over practical reasoning does not, however, open a
path for the critics to prevail in their arguments against originalism. A richer
account of constitutional reasoning does not discredit the originalists’ textual
and historical arguments or privilege the competing modes of argument that
their critics emphasize. But without a resolution of the dispute over the nature
of practical reasoning in constitutional decision, the potential to move beyond
the debate appears remote. Originalism employs its account to buttress its
central claim that the textual and historical methods of originalism are
privileged, generally controlling in the interpretation of the Constitution that
originalists endorse. Without that privilege, originalism is no longer
originalism in any of the canonical forms that we have known it, even if the
originalist methods of argument survive intact. On my account, the claims
with respect to practical reasoning and the interpretative method are central to
the claim to privilege historical and textual modes of argument. Rebutting
those arguments may simply send the originalists in search of alternative
grounds for such a privilege. If their critics acknowledge that their richer,
alternative account of constitutional reasoning does not discredit textual or
historical arguments—or privilege competing modes of argument—then they
are likely to go in search of such alternative arguments. In that event, only the
field on which the debate over originalism unfolds would change. 406 But both
responses would be mistakes.

404

See LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6.
See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 194; LeDuc,
Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6.
406
It may appear that the project of this article and the substantive conclusions
expressed here are inconsistent with my deflationary account of the debate. See
LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 32, The arguments
here are simply therapeutic strategies to elucidate the confusions inherent in the
originalism debate.
405
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Why then do the accounts of interpretation and practical reasoning matter,
if the two stances in the debate and debate itself are confused and its pursuit
fruitless? The accounts of interpretation and practical reasoning matter
because if the theoretical commitments to particular accounts underlying the
originalism debate are discarded, then we can recognize the legitimacy of a
more complex practice of constitutional argument and decision. If that more
inclusive, pluralist practice is legitimate, then we may return to that practice
without the aspirations of the protagonists in the debate to fundamentally
reform our practice of constitutional argument and decision. We may return
to the project of considering the merits of competing decisions and alternative
arguments for the hard constitutional questions that we face. 407 Getting it right
with respect to the role of interpretation and the nature of constitutional
reasoning does not open a path to revivify the originalism debate but to
transcend it.

407
See generally LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 6, at 197–220 (sketching a
post-debate reconstruction of three recent constitutional cases).

